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INTRODUCTION
According to the rational choice theory of human behavior-the
predominant theory in economics and an influential theory in other
disciplines, including law-people strive to enhance their own well-
being. Among the available options, they rationally choose the one
that would maximize their expected utility, determined in absolute
terms.
In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky offered a
competing descriptive theory of people's preferences and choices under
risk, known as Prospect Theory ("PT').' This theory differs from the
rational choice theory in several respects. First and foremost, the
theory posits that people generally do not perceive outcomes as final
states of wealth or welfare, but rather as gains and losses. Gains and
losses are defined relative to a baseline or reference point. The value
function is normally steeper for losses than gains, indicating loss
aversion. People's choices therefore crucially depend on the way that
they frame any choice. In particular, an individual's reference point
determines whether she perceives changes as gains or losses. Usually,
but not invariably, people take the status quo as the baseline. The
centrality of reference points and the notion that losses loom larger
than gains hold true for risky and riskless choices alike. 2
PT and related psychological phenomena, such as the
endowment effect and the status quo bias,3 have had a significant
impact on legal theory. Dozens of studies have analyzed their
implications for a range of legal doctrines in various contexts.
Typically, these studies will do one or more of the following: highlight
the contribution of PT to improve the understanding of human
behavior in legal contexts; advise legal actors how to take the theory's
implications into account in interactive legal encounters; or analyze its
1. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
2. See Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 43-47 (1980) (introducing the "endowment effect ' whereby individuals tend to
value things they already own more greatly than things they do not own); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J.
ECON. 1039 (1991) (applying the notions of reference dependence and loss aversion to riskless
choices); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economists,
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1457 (2003) (highlighting the importance of reference dependence and
loss aversion in risky and riskless choice).
3. See infra notes 14, 17, 32-37 and accompanying text.
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significance for legal policymaking on a variety of issues.4 The present
Article is more ambitious. It argues that the notions of reference
points and loss aversion permeate the law and illuminate
fundamental characteristics of the legal system itself. Reference
points and loss aversion may explain basic features of entire legal
fields and even the relative importance of different fields within the
legal system. In addition, the Article offers new explanatory theories
regarding the compatibility of the cognitive phenomenon of loss
aversion and law's fundamental characteristics and presents a
comprehensive analysis of the normative implications of loss aversion
for law and lawmaking. 5
Consider the tort/unjust-enrichment puzzle, the anomalous
takings/givings disparity, and the centrality of the "interests" in
contract remedies. The first, recently revisited by Ariel Porat and
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 6 concerns the fact that a person's behavior
often creates negative and positive external effects for others, without
their consent. From an economic perspective, the actor should
internalize both negative and positive externalities to induce efficient
behavior. However, in practically all legal systems, the law of tort,
which requires injurers to pay for their negative externalities, is far
more developed and effective than the law of unjust enrichment,
which entitles benefactors to recover the benefits they confer on
others.
The takings/givings anomaly, brought to the fore several years
ago by Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, 7 refers to the
4. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
5. For a previous attempt to explain a range of legal doctrines through the lenses of the
disparate valuations of losses and gains, see David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice
and Disparities Between Measures of Economic Values, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 737 (1992). The
present Article differs from that fine article in important respects. While Cohen and Knetsch
focused on judicial decisions (mostly Canadian and English), the present Article discusses all
sources of law, including statutory and constitutional norms, drawing primarily from U.S. law.
More importantly, most of the doctrines discussed by Cohen and Knetsch are somewhat peculiar
(e.g., the role of motives in contract breaches and the common law reluctance to enforce contract
modifications unsupported by consideration and gratuitous promises) and some are rather
questionable (e.g., Cohen and Knetsch interpret remedies for breach of contract as primarily
protecting the reliance interest; see also infra Part II.C). In contrast, the present Article focuses
on fundamental characteristics of entire legal fields. It also more fully explores competing
explanations for the phenomena it discusses, examines theories that may account for the
compatibility between psychological findings and the law, and discusses the normative
implications of the analysis. Finally, this Article reflects recent advancements in psychological
research.
6. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 21 (2009); Ariel Porat,
Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189
(2009).
7. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE LJ. 547 (2001).
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fundamentally different ways that law and legal theory treat
governmental takings of private property and other entitlements as
opposed to governmental givings of entitlements. While most liberal
legal systems set legal or even constitutional limits on takings and
require adequate compensation for at least some forms of takings, the
limits on governmental givings and the requirement to charge the
recipients for such benefits are much weaker. This disparate
treatment of governmental takings and givings is apparently
incompatible with the pertinent efficiency, distribution, and fairness
considerations.
The third illustration concerns contract remedies.
Conventionally, remedies for breach of contract are thought of as
protecting the injured party's expectation interest, though some
renowned scholars have argued that contract law should and does
protect the reliance interest, and others have claimed that it should
also protect the disgorgement interest. Despite the equivocal
arguments against broader availability of disgorgement remedies,
these remedies are marginal in practically all legal systems. More
fundamentally, over a decade ago, Richard Craswell powerfully
challenged the descriptive and normative usefulness of the
conventional classification of the different interests protected by
contract remedies.8 He argued that none of the major theories of
contract law is necessarily committed to specifically protecting any of
the recognized interests. Nevertheless, two striking features of
contract law are (a) the enduring recourse of contract doctrine and
theory to the conventional classification, and (b) the basic denial of
protection for the disgorgement interest.
Various explanations and justifications have been offered for
these and similar puzzles. Without dismissing other explanations, this
Article claims that these puzzles can at least partially be explained by,
or better understood through, the notions of reference points and loss
aversion. Contrary to some normative theories, and in keeping with
the way people think and reason in general, the law is structured
around various baselines. Since losses loom larger than gains, the law
more readily and effectively rectifies unjustified losses than helps
people recover gains that they failed to obtain.
In addition to establishing the connection between loss
aversion and the law, the Article strives to explain their compatibility.
One explanation is evolutionary, drawing in part on the "efficiency of
the common law" theory proposed by legal economists. Since people
find losses more painful than unobtained gains, they file lawsuits for
8. Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2000).
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recovery of losses far more often than for unobtained gains. As a
result, legal doctrines dealing with the former are much more
developed than those dealing with the latter.
Another explanation is based on the mindset of legal
rulemakers, such as legislators and judges. It contends that legal
thinking largely follows commonsense morality, which generally
conforms to moderate deontology. As such, the law perforce
distinguishes between harming people and not aiding them, which in
turn presupposes the existence of a baseline. Since prevailing moral
intuitions embody baselines and a prohibition against harming other
people (far more than a duty to benefit others), these notions are also
manifest in the law. This explanation points to an important
correspondence between psychology, morality, and law.
The analysis also has important normative implications.
Primarily, if due to loss aversion the decrease in people's well-being
when they do not get something is considerably smaller than when
something is taken from them, then, ceteris paribus, the law should
favor not giving over taking. To the extent that the law strives to
enhance human well-being, it should concentrate on redressing losses,
rather than on entitling people to recover unattained gains.
The normative implications (and to some extent, the
explanatory arguments) are complicated by the interaction between
the law and people's perceptions. A central insight of PT is that the
reference point by which people assess gains and losses is to some
extent unfixed and manipulable. This malleability means that, by
setting baselines, the law may affect people's perceptions, judgments,
and choices. This observation cautions against any hasty move from
explanation to justification. It also provides a prima facie reason to be
cautious about legal reforms entailing both gainers and losers. When
considering such reforms, the gains and losses should be weighted
differently, as the latter loom larger than the former. Moreover, since
the new legal regime may create a new baseline, undoing the reform
and restoring the preexisting legal order is likely to be rather difficult.
As opposed to these conservative arguments, the recognition
that the law not only mirrors people's reference points, but also
sometimes shapes them, may lead to progressive and even radical
normative conclusions. It calls for critical reexamination of those
doctrines and policies that rest on questionable framings of the
pertinent issues and opens the door to using the law as a means to
reframe perceptions. Lawmakers' own loss aversion is thus a cause for
concern.
The Article begins in Part I with a short overview of the vast
psychological literature on loss aversion. Part II then demonstrates
2012]
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how several fundamental features of law, which are seemingly
inexplicable, can be better understood through the lenses of baselines
and loss aversion. The primary examples are taken from a number of
legal fields, including tort and unjust enrichment (the costs/benefits
puzzle), constitutional property law (the takings/givings anomaly),
contract law (the goals of contract remedies), and civil-rights law
(hiring versus firing in affirmative-action plans). Others come from
fields including human-rights law (civil and political versus social and
economic rights), criminal law (the defense of necessity), tax law (tax
deductions), and evidence law (burden of proof in civil litigation).
Part III discusses two theories that may explain the centrality
of loss aversion in law. The first, evolutionary theory, focuses on the
role of plaintiffs in the development of law. The second explains the
compatibility between law and psychology via commonsense morality.
Part IV presents possible normative implications of the
analysis, some of which are conservative and others progressive. They
include justifying the characteristics of the law discussed in Part II,
exploring the significance of the law's impact on people's reference
points, and examining lawmakers' own loss aversion.
I. Loss AVERSION: AN OVERVIEW
A brief history. In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli revolutionized
economic thinking by arguing that, very often, people's preferences
and choices do not aim at maximizing the expected value of outcomes
(the probability-weighted sum of possible random values), but rather
their expected utility.9 In 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern reinterpreted Bernoulli's theory and introduced the von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function which still serves as the basis
of rational choice theory.10 According to their theorem, people's
preferences and choices depend not only on the expected value of
different outcomes, but also on their risk aversion, which in turn
depends on their overall assets. According to the law of diminishing
marginal utility, the utility one derives from any additional unit of a
good or service is smaller than the utility one derives from the
previous unit. Expected utility theory assumes that one's assessment
9. Daniel Bernoulli, Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk (1738),
reprinted in 22 ECONOMETRICA 23 (Louise Sommer trans., 1954).
10. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND EcONOMIc
BEHAVIOR (1944).
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of different outcomes is independent of any reference point. Actual
losses are equivalent to foregone gains.'1
This reference independence was challenged as early as the
1950s. 12 Only in 1979, however, did Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky come up with a full-fledged theory of people's decisions under
risk that constituted a powerful alternative to expected utility theory:
Prospect Theory.' 3 This theory was based on experimental evidence
and was formalized mathematically. In 1980, Richard Thaler used PT
to explain the phenomenon that people attach greater value to things
they already have than to things they have yet to acquire (which he
coined the endowment effect), thus applying PT to riskless choices. 14
In 1992, Tversky and Kahneman presented a modified version of the
original PT, extending it in several respects including to riskless (in
addition to risky) decisions and to decisions involving more than two
options.' 5 PT has inspired numerous studies and had a major effect on
such disciplines as cognitive psychology, economics, finance, political
science, and law. In 2002, Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in
economics primarily for his contribution, together with Amos Tversky
(who passed away in 1996), to formulating PT.
Prospect Theory, reference points, and loss aversion. PT
comprises several elements, all of which differ from the tenets of
expected utility theory. Most importantly, PT posits that people
ordinarily perceive outcomes as gains and losses, rather than as final
states of wealth or welfare. Gains and losses are defined relative to a
reference point. The value function is normally concave for gains
11. On expected utility theory and its role within rational choice theory, see Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption
from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1060-66 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Harry Markowitz, The Utility of Wealth, 60 J. POL. ECON. 151 (1952)
(proposing a modified utility function that differentiates between gains and losses); Armen A.
Alchian, The Meaning of Utility Measurement, 43 AM. ECON. REV. 26, 44-46 (1953) (discussing
reference-dependent utility functions).
13. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 1.
14. Thaler, supra note 2, at 43-47. For earlier studies documenting the gap between the
maximal sum that people are willing to pay for an entitlement and the minimal sum that they
are willing to accept to forgo a similar entitlement, see, for example, JUDD HAMMACK & GARDNER
M. BROWN JR, WATERFOWL AND WETLANDS: TOWARD BIo-EcONOMIc ANALYsIS 26-27 (1974)
(reporting that hunters were willing to pay an average of $247 to continue hunting but
demanded an average compensation of $1044 to sell their hunting rights); C.H. Coombs, T.G.
Bezembinder & F.M. Goode, Testing Expectation Theories of Decision Making Without Measuring
Utility or Subjective Probability, 4 J. MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOL 72, 80-96 (1967) (describing an
experiment in which average selling prices for lottery tickets were more than twice as high as
buying prices). On the endowment effect, see also infra notes 17, 32-36 and accompanying text.
15. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
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(implying risk aversion), convex for losses (reflecting risk seeking),
and generally steeper for losses than for gains. This means that the
disutility generated by a loss is greater than the utility produced by a
similar gain. Tversky and Kahneman estimated that monetary losses
loom larger than gains by a factor of 2.25.16 A meta-analysis of 164
experiments of the related phenomenon of endowment effect found
that the median ratio between people's willingness to pay ("WTP") for
a good they don't yet have and their willingness to accept ("WTA') to
part with a similar good is 1:2.9 (with very substantial variation). 17 PT
also posits that people's risk aversion in the domain of gains and their
risk seeking in the domain of losses are reversed for low-probability
gains and losses. Finally, PT postulates that the subjective weighing
of probabilities systematically deviates from the objective
probabilities.' 8 The central elements of PT-what Kahneman hailed as
"the core idea[s] of prospect theory"-are, however, reference
dependence (the notion that "the value function is kinked at the
reference point") and loss aversion. 19
Significantly, PT posits that the benchmark by which people
perceive outcomes as either gains or losses crucially depends on the
way that they frame the scenario or choice that they face. Numerous
experiments have demonstrated that people choose differently among
essentially identical alternatives, depending on the way that they are
induced to frame the choice problem. 20 Ordinarily, people take the
16. Id. at 311.
17. Serdar Sayman & Ay~e Onciller, Effects of Study Design Characteristics on the WTA-
WTP Disparity: A Meta Analytical Framework, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 289, 300, 302 (2005). On
the endowment effect, see infra note 32 and accompanying text. For mathematical definitions of
loss aversion, see PETER P. WAKKER, PROSPECT THEORY: FOR RISK AND AMBIGUIIY 238-40, 252-
54 (2010); Mohammed Abdellaoui, Han Bleichrodt & Corina Paraschiv, Loss Aversion Under
Prospect Theory: A Parameter-Free Measurement, 53 MGMT. SCI. 1659, 1661-62 (2007).
18. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 1, at 265-67, 280-84; Tversky & Kahneman, supra
note 15, at 303, 306, 312-13.
19. Kalneman, supra note 2, at 1457.
20. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981) (describing the famous Asian disease
experiment in which respondents' choice between two different medical treatments were
reversed, depending on whether the data was presented in terms of expected death or expected
survival); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59
J. BUS. S251 (1986) (providing additional evidence of framing effects and discussing their
implications); see also Anton Kiihberger, The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-
Analysis, 75 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROC. 23 (1998) (concluding, on the basis of meta-
analysis of 136 papers, that framing is a reliable phenomenon, though different manipulations
produce different sizes of this effect); Avital Moshinsky & Maya Bar-Hillel, Loss Aversion and the
Status Quo Label Bias, 28 SOC. COGNITION 191 (2010) (finding a framing effect in a study of
policy choices). On the implications of this phenomenon for legal policymaking, see infra notes
243-65 and accompanying text.
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status quo as the reference point and view changes from this point as
either gains or losses. 21 It has been demonstrated, however, that this
assumption is primarily appropriate for contexts where people expect
to maintain the status quo. When expectations differ from the status
quo, as is often the case in market environments, taking people's
expectations as the pertinent reference point may yield better
explanations and predictions of their behavior.22 The status of other
people also influences an individual's perception of the reference point.
For example, when an employee receives a smaller salary raise than
everyone else in a workplace, she may view this raise as a loss, even
though her position was improved in absolute terms.23 Finally, one's
reference point may change in dynamic situations. Most research
suggests that people quickly adapt their reference point following the
making of gains, but that they are much less inclined to adjust their
reference point after incurring losses. 24
Empirical studies. Loss aversion has been found not only in
laboratory experiments around the world, 25 but also in a number of
real-world contexts. For example, it is well known that stock rates are
more volatile and riskier than treasury bills and other bonds. Yet, for
21. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 2, at 1046-47 ("[T]he reference state usually
corresponds to the decision maker's current position... [but] it can be influenced by aspirations,
expectations, norms, and social comparisons.").
22. See, e.g., Botond Kbszegi & Matthew Rabin, A Model of Reference-Dependent
Preferences, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1133 (2006) (proposing an economic model taking people's
expectations as the pertinent reference point); Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, Reference-
Dependent Risk Attitude, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1047 (2007) (extending their model, taking people's
recent beliefs about the outcome as their reference point); Johannes Abeler et al., Reference
Points and Effort Provision (Mar. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1365135) (providing experimental support for expectation-based
reference dependence); Andreas Hack & Frauke Lammers, The Role of Expectations in the
Formation of Reference Points (May 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
http://www.smu.ca/iarepsabeO9/documents/Lammers-A.pdo (providing experimental evidence
that expectations significantly affect the formation of reference points and subsequent choices).
On legal implications of this phenomenon, see infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
23. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 349 (1984); cf. George F. Lowenstein, Leigh Thompson & Max H. Bazerman,
Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL 426 (1989) (finding that in interpersonal contexts, the outcomes of another person-
rather than one's own status quo-may emerge as an alternative or additional reference point).
24. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes et al., Reference Point Adaptation: Tests in the Domain of Security
Trading, 105 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 67 (2008) (exposing this
phenomenon in the context of security trading); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard
H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1325 (1990) (demonstrating and discussing the "instant endowment effece').
25. For evidence of loss aversion in a nonwestern society, see, for example, Stephen J.
Humphrey & Arjan Verschoor, Decision-Making Under Risk Among Small Farmers in East
Uganda, 13 J. AFR. ECON. 44, 88-89 (2004).
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
many years, the gap between long-term returns on stocks and bonds
has been so great that it becomes difficult to explain the demand for
bonds on the basis of standard notions of risk aversion. 26 However,
this so-called equity-premium puzzle is perfectly compatible with loss
aversion, assuming investors evaluate their portfolios annually. To
avoid even a small risk of loss, people are willing to forego
considerable expected gains.27
Another empirically studied phenomenon that may best be
explained through the notion of loss aversion is advocates' fee
arrangements. Empirical data indicates that lawyers often earn a
considerably higher effective hourly fee when they charge plaintiffs on
a contingency fee ("CF') basis-that is, when the fee is calculated as a
certain percentage of the recovery and hence no fee is paid if the claim
fails-than a noncontingent fee basis.28 Whereas some commentators
explain this phenomenon on the basis of standard market failures, 29 a
more compelling explanation is that while a CF is perceived as a pure
positive gamble (the client may win or break even), a noncontingent
fee exposes the plaintiff to a risk of loss (if the claim fails and the
client still has to pay the fee). Plaintiffs are willing to pay a
considerably higher expected fee to avoid even a small risk of loss.30
These are but two examples of empirically studied phenomena
demonstrating the crucial role that loss aversion plays in people's
behavior. Numerous other examples are readily available. 31
Related phenomena. The notions of reference points and loss
aversion have also been used to explain such phenomena as the
26. Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium: A Puzzle, 15 J. MONETARY
ECON. 145 (1985).
27. Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium
Puzzle, 110 Q.J. ECON. 73 (1995).
28. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 761-68 (2002) (indicating that in the early 1990s in Wisconsin, the mean
effective hourly fee resulting from CF ($242) was almost twice as large as the ordinary hourly fee
($124)); cf HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 180-218 (2004) (analyzing additional data on contingency fees
for legal services).
29. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It
Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 68 (2003) (arguing that high CF rates reflect such
market failures as plaintiffs' information problems and lawyers' uniform pricing practices).
30. Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Revisiting the Debate over Attorneys' Contingent Fees: A
Behavioral Analysis, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 245 (2010) (demonstrating that PT accounts for this and
other aspects of the contingency fee market).
31. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild Evidence from the Field, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 288 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (surveying
numerous studies providing empirical support for PT); Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and
Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 315, 324-36 (2009) (same).
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endowment effect and the status quo bias. The endowment effect,
sometimes dubbed the WTA-WTP disparity, refers to the phenomenon
that individuals tend to place higher value on objects and entitlements
that they already have, compared to objects and entitlements that
they do not have.32 Arguably, parting with (at least some) objects is
perceived as losing them, whereas acquiring objects is perceive d as
gaining them. The status quo bias refers to the phenomenon that
people tend to stick to the state of affairs that they perceive as the
status quo rather than opting for an alternative state.33 When
departing from the status quo may result in either gains or losses,
people are inclined to avoid such a departure. Closely connected to an
omission bias,34 the status quo bias explains a robust default effect,
the tendency not to opt out of default arrangements. 35 Interestingly,
even contractual default rules, which arguably do not endow people
with any entitlement unless they find a partner willing to contract
with them without deviating from the default, create an endowment
effect and result in a status quo bias. 36 Another phenomenon
associated with loss aversion is the consideration of sunk costs.
Contrary to the microeconomic notion that only future costs should
32. Thaler, supra note 2; see also David W. Harless, More Laboratory Evidence on the
Disparity Between Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
359 (1989); Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 24; Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden,
Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected
Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984).
33. See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 23, at 348 (describing an experiment in
which most subjects who were asked to imagine that they hold a certain job preferred to stay in
that job rather than switch to an alternative one with different characteristics-some of which
were better and some worse-regardless of the job they were holding); see also Daniel
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197-99 (1991); William Samuelson & Richard
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (analyzing a
host of experimental and empirical studies demonstrating this bias).
34. See, e.g., Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and Omission Biases, 5 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 49 (1992) (finding that subjects preferred inaction even when it was associated
with change).
35. See, e.g., Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in
401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149 (2001) (describing a natural
experiment where changing the default from nonparticipation to participation in retirement
savings dramatically increased employees' participation); see also DellaVigna, supra note 31, at
322 (concluding that "the finding of large default effects is one of the most robust results in the
applied economics literature of the last ten years").
36. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L REV.
608 (1998) (experimentally demonstrating the endowment effect of contract default rules); Eyal
Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1710, 1760-62 (1997) (arguing that contract default rules plausibly create a default effect).
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
affect one's decisions, people take past investments into consideration
because they dislike the notion of wasting (losing) resources.37
Loss aversion and emotions. Gains and losses are closely
connected to emotions of pleasure and pain, and emotions are
triggered by changes. A descriptive theory of choice must therefore
take into consideration feelings such as the pain of loss and the regret
of mistakes. 38 In the context of choosing among risky alternatives, the
following has been demonstrated: ex ante, people anticipate that
losses will result in a greater adverse hedonic impact than the positive
impact of gains of equal magnitude; however, ex post people
rationalize their losses and do not experience as great an adverse
effect as predicted. Thus, at least sometimes, the status quo bias
results from an affective forecast rather than from affective
experience .39
Evolutionary roots. It has been hypothesized that loss aversion
has biological and evolutionary roots. Laboratory experiments have
indicated that the choices of capuchin monkeys displayed reference
dependence and loss aversion.40 More generally, numerous studies of
various territorial animals reveal that defenders of a territory almost
invariably overcome intruders of the same species who try to take over
their territory.41 Residents who face the risk of losing their territory
exert more effort than challengers who try to gain new territory.42 In
the context of the endowment effect, it has been hypothesized that the
relative security of exchange, thanks to the availability of legal and
37. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Costs, 35
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985) (describing experiments
demonstrating the sunk costs effect); Thaler, supra note 2, at 47-50 (modeling sunk costs).
38. Kahneman, supra note 2, at 1457, 1463.
39. Deborah A. Kermer et al., Loss Aversion Is an Affective Forecasting Error, 17 PSYCHOL
SCI. 649 (2006). On loss aversion, beliefs, and emotions, see also Barbara A. Mellers & Ilana
Ritov, How Beliefs Influence the Relative Magnitude of Pleasure and Pain, 23 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 369 (2010).
40. M. Keith Chen, Venkat Lakshminarayanan & Laurie R. Santos, How Basic Are
Behavioral Biases? Evidence from Capuchin Monkey Trading Behavior, 114 J. POL. ECON. 517
(2006) (describing experiments in which monkeys learned to trade tokens for food and could
choose between trading with either of two experimenters).
41. See JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 278-84 (9th ed.
2009) (discussing theoretical and experimentally tested explanations for the phenomenon that
"when a territory holder is challenged by a rival, the owner almost always wins the contest-
usually within a matter of seconds'); JACK W. BRADBURY & SANDRA L. VEHRENCAMP, PRINCIPLES
OF ANIMAL COMMUNICATION 711-30 (1998) (employing game theory models to examine different
explanations for this phenomenon).
42. Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 405, 453-54 (2005).
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other enforcement mechanisms, is a fairly recent development. The
reluctance to exchange what one possesses in return for something
else, so the argument goes, was conducive for survival when exchange
was much riskier. Although it is no longer adaptive to modern
conditions, it continues to shape people's choices. 43 Other theories
aspire to provide psychological and evolutionary explanations for
prevailing moral intuitions that differentiate between losses and
gains .44
Critique. PT, including its core notions of reference points and
loss aversion, has been the subject of considerable critique. To begin,
PT is not the only theory that aims at explaining and predicting
people's manifest loss aversion in risky choices. While PT explains loss
aversion as resulting from a kink in people's utility function at the
reference point and the greater steepness of the utility function in the
domain of losses, configural weight theories posit that loss aversion
results from the different weight that people attribute to losses and
gains, which in turn depends on the perspective from which they judge
the choice problem. 45 Configural weight theories and PT are not
mutually exclusive, yet they differ in some of their predictions. In any
case, they all recognize that people view losses and gains differently
and are averse to losses. Hence, for the present purpose, one need not
delve into their dissimilarities.
More importantly for our purposes, some studies have
challenged the generality of loss aversion. Evidently, different people
display varying degrees of loss aversion under different circumstances.
Moreover, some studies indicate that loss aversion is neutralized or
even reversed for very small amounts of money,46 and the same is true
under certain experimental settings. 47 Some scholars doubt that PT is
43. Owen D, Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New Theory of the
Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935, 1955-61 (2008).
44. See infra notes 220-30 and accompanying text.
45. Michael H. Birnbaum, New Paradoxes of Risky Decision Making, 115 PSYCHOL. REV.
463 (2008) (arguing that numerous experimental findings are incompatible with PT yet
compatible with configural weight theories); Michael H. Birnbaum & Steven E. Stegner, Source
Credibility in Social Judgment: Bias, Expertise, and the Judge's Point of View, 37 J.
PERSONAUTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 48 (1979) (describing experiments in which subjects who assessed
the value of a car based on different estimates placed greater weight on the higher estimate
when asked to make the assessment from the seller's perspective and extra weight on the lower
estimate when making the assessment from the buyer's perspective).
46. Fieke Harinck et al., When Gains Loom Larger than Losses: Reversed Loss Aversion for
Small Amounts of Money, 18 PSYCHOL. SO. 1099 (2007).
47. See, e.g., Eyal Ert & Ido Erev, The Rejection of Attractive Gambles, Loss Aversion, and
the Lemon Avoidance Heuristic, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 715 (2008) (describing experiments in
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the appropriate explanation for such phenomena as the observed
WTA-WTP gap.48 Yet, the overall picture emerging from hundreds of
theoretical, experimental, and empirical studies is clear. People's
preferences, choices, and judgments do generally depend on the
perceived reference point and display strong loss aversion.
Impact on legal theory. Over the past decades, behavioral
studies have profoundly impacted economic, finance, and legal theory.
Numerous legal theorists have utilized PT, including its key elements
of reference points and loss aversion and the related phenomena of
endowment effect and status quo bias, in various legal contexts. Often,
commentators used these psychological insights to criticize the
explanatory and normative force of standard economic analysis of
law.49 These insights were also relied upon to illuminate human
behavior in legal contexts, advise legal actors how to act in interactive
legal encounters, and inform legal policymaking.50 Notable
contributions to this body of literature include Jeffrey Rachlinski's
analysis of litigants' behavior in settlement negotiations,51 Russell
Korobkin's study of people's reluctance to contract around default
rules due to the status quo bias,52 and Edward McCaffery's analysis of
hidden taxes and loss aversion. 53
Without detracting from the great contribution of these and
other analyses, the present Article goes one step further. It examines
which people tend to reject attractive mixed gambles when asked to decide whether to accept
them, but not in choice tasks).
48. See, e.g., Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to
Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for
Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530 (2005); Charles R Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange
Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect
Theory?, 97 Am. ECON. REV. 1449 (2007); see also Thomas C. Brown & Robin Gregory, Why the
WTA-WTP Disparity Matters?, 28 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 323, 326-29 (1999) (surveying eight
different explanations for the WTA-WTP disparity); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect
and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1242-55 (2003) (examining various explanations for
the endowment effect).
49. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL L. REV. 669, 678-95 (1979) (challenging the validity of the Coase
theorem); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 11, at 1102-13 (discussing these challenges to expected
utility theory as well as their implications for legal policy).
50. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1115, 1120-55 (2003) (surveying legal applications of PT, focusing on people's different
attitudes to gains and losses); Korobkin, supra note 48, at 1256-93 (carefully analyzing possible
normative implications of the endowment effect in various legal contexts).
51. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
113 (1996).
52. Korobkin, supra note 36.
53. Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1874-86
(1994).
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how the notions of reference points and loss aversion explain
fundamental characteristics of entire legal fields and their relative
importance.
II. BASELINES, LOSS AVERSION, AND THE LAW
This Part demonstrates the crucial role that baselines and loss
aversion play in various fields of law-private and public, substantive
and procedural. The examples include the dissimilar role that tort law
and the law of unjust enrichment play in all legal systems (the so-
called costs/benefits puzzle); the fundamentally different treatment of
takings and givings in constitutional property law; the central role
and different statuses of the four interests protected by remedies for
breach of contract; and the difference between not hiring and firing in
affirmative-action plans. Additional illustrations will be mentioned in
Part II.E. Since the explanatory and justificatory power of loss
aversion are discussed in detail in Parts III and IV, respectively, this
Part will put more emphasis on critically examining alternative
explanations and justifications for the various puzzling phenomena.
A. Tort Law vs. Unjust Enrichment
A common feature of all legal systems, including the U.S.
system, is the manifest gap between the centrality of the law of tort
and the relative marginal status of the law of restitution or unjust
enrichment. 54 Interactions in which one person suffers injury or loss
due to another person's conduct, without the latter gaining any
obvious benefit, give rise to legal entitlements and remedies far more
frequently than interactions in which one person receives a
considerable benefit thanks to another person's conduct while the
latter suffers no significant loss. 55 Even in legal systems that most
54. For a comparative analysis of the often residual and limited role of unjust -enrichment
claims in various legal systems, see Brice Dickson, Unjust Enrichment Claims: A Comparative
Overview, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 100 (1995). As regards U.S. law, see, for example, Richard A.
Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL L. REV. 1369, 1369-71 (1994)
(criticizing the prevailing worldview according to which private law consists of property, torts,
and contracts-thus leaving unjust enrichment as a mere component of the law of remedies or as
incidental to the major three fields); Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution,
and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 450 (1992) ("Tort law flourishes, while
restitution law remains a virtual backwater ...."); Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and
Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (2006) ("[C]ompared to tort, [restitution] is a trifling part of
the law.").
55. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 71 (1985) (pointing to
the "anomaly" of the "harms-benefits asymmetry"; namely, that "the legal remedies available to
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liberally recognize unjust enrichment as a cause of action, such as
Israeli law, recoveries of damages for civil wrongs are overwhelmingly
more common than recoveries of restitution for unjust enrichment.
Whereas many attorneys describe themselves as "tort lawyers,"
practically no one is described as an "unjust-enrichment lawyer."
Relatedly, when the same interaction results in both injury to one side
and benefit to the other, the remedial rights of the injured party are
usually based on that party's losses, rather than on the other party's
gains .56
This asymmetry has attracted the attention of legal
economists. 57 From an efficiency perspective, the railroad company
whose trains' sparks set adjacent fields on fire is no more responsible
for the ensuing losses than the farmers who planted their crops next
to the railroad. Using spark arresters to eliminate the risk of fire may
be described as either avoiding (possibly compensable) harm to the
farmers or conferring (possibly recoverable) benefit upon them. The
same holds true for the farmers not planting crops next to the
railroad. 58 Moreover, even if some activities should be regarded as
having negative externalities while others should be regarded as
yielding positive ones,59 to induce efficient behavior the actor should
internalize both negative and positive externalities. Yet, the law of
tort requires injurers to pay for their negative externalities much
more often than the law of unjust enrichment entitles benefactors to
regain the benefits that they confer upon others.
Various explanations have been offered for this puzzle. Saul
Levmore has argued that in typical tort cases, bargaining between
potential injurers and victims (such as road users) is prohibitively
costly, whereas such bargaining is often feasible in the context of
benefits. Hence, recognizing a right of restitution for nonbargained
benefits would discourage the development of a competitive market, as
victims of harms are far superior to those enjoyed by analogous providers of nonbargained
benefits').
56. Ofer Grosskopf, Protection of Competition Rules ia the Law of Restitution, 79 TEx. L.
REV. 1981, 1994-95 (2001). Part II.C below discusses one manifestation of this phenomenon. See
also infra notes 71, 132, 197 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 57 (1984); Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 6; Levmore, supra note 55; Porat, supra note 6.
58. Wittman, supra note 57, at 58-59; see also Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960) (highlighting the reciprocal nature of social costs).
59. See Wittman, supra note 57, at 61-73 (proposing to set the baseline with a view to
minimizing the administrative costs involved in implementing the system of entitlements and
remedies). For a critique of Wittman's analysis, see Epstein, supra note 54, at 1371-76. For
additional reasons as to why the law does not entitle people to recover for not harming others,
see Gordon, supra note 54, at 455-62.
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service providers would be able to compel nonconsenting recipients to
pay for the benefits, rather than compete with other providers for
voluntary transactions. 60
Another efficiency explanation, offered by Ariel Porat, focuses
on the difference between negative and positive externalities in terms
of the results of affording the affected people a veto power over the
relevant activity. Unlike the previous explanation, this one assumes
that bargaining may be unfeasible for both negative and positive
externalities. In the case of negative externalities, if an actor had to
acquire the consent of every potential injured person before engaging
in an activity, then each individual could withhold that consent,
thereby thwarting socially desirable activities, such as driving. By
protecting people's entitlements through liability rules, tort law
concurrently avoids this inefficient result and compels injurers to
internalize the cost of their behavior. In the case of positive
externalities, the refusal of any beneficiary to pay for the received
benefit may also thwart efficient activities whose costs are higher than
their benefits to the actor and to the remaining people sharing the
costs. However, oftentimes such activities will be carried out despite
the refusal of one or more beneficiary to pay for the benefit because
enough benefit is produced for those who shoulder the costs. Free
riders do not have veto power over beneficial activity.61 Thus, a
general right of restitution for unrequested benefits is considerably
less crucial than a right to damages for losses.
Another concern militating against a general right of
restitution for unrequested benefits is the valuation difficulties that
courts would face were such a right recognized. To be sure, the law of
torts faces similar difficulties, but there they are often inevitable (in
the absence of feasible voluntary bargaining). In contrast, when it
comes to benefits, not only are voluntary transactions often feasible,
but there is also a much greater risk of overvaluation. Even if a
certain benefit has an ascertainable market value, unless the benefit
is monetary, the recipient of the nonbargained benefit may well
attribute lower subjective value to it. After all, most people do not
purchase most goods and services offered on the market-which
means that they value them less than their market price. 62 Yet,
60. See Levmore, supra note 55, at 79-82 (discussing "market encouragement'); see also
Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 6, at 24-25, 31-33 (making a similar argument).
61. Porat, supra note 6, at 198-205.
62. Gordon, supra note 54, at 456-57 ("People cannot afford to buy everything they might
like to have, including protection from harm. Being forced to pay for something one would not
have purchased is a harm, even if one is required to pay no more than fair market value for it.");
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another efficiency argument against a broader right of restitution
focuses on the greater difficulties that a benefactor *who has to
establish another person's gains faces, as compared to a tort victim
who has to prove her own losses. 63
Other arguments against compelling people to pay for
unrequested benefits shift the focus from overall efficiency and
administrative costs to the recipient's liberty. Freedom of contract
requires not only that people be free to make bargains as they please,
but also that they be free from unwanted bargains. This negative
aspect of freedom of contract clearly militates against a right of
restitution for unrequested benefits. 64 A related explanation is that
tort liability is ordinarily imposed for an injurer's active and voluntary
behavior, whereas claims based on unrequested benefits usually refer
to passive and involuntary recipients. 65
All of the above arguments are contestable, and none of them
provides a complete justification or explanation for the intricacies of
the law. For instance, Levmore's assumptions regarding both the
feasibility of bargaining between potential benefactors and
beneficiaries and the infeasibility of bargaining between potential
injurers and victims are questionable: beneficial activities sometimes
affect numerous, unidentified people, while harmful activities often
adversely affect specific, easily identified ones.66 Porat's theory, in
turn, only explains why the social cost of not recognizing an expansive
duty of restitution for unrequested benefits is much smaller than the
social cost that would have resulted from not requiring injurers to
compensate the nonconsenting injured. Yet, Porat does not explain-
and in fact criticizes-the law's unwillingness to adopt a considerably
broader right of restitution.6 7 The economic justifications for the
tort/unjust-enrichment asymmetry may also be criticized for their
Levmore, supra note 55, at 69-72 (discussing the valuation difficulties). On ways to overcome
this problem, see Porat, supra note 6, at 209-14.
63. Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 6, at 25, 40-42. For a similar argument in the context of
contract remedies, see infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. Dari-Mattiacci further
proposes an economic rationale for the tort/unjust-enrichment asymmetry based on their
dissimilarity in terms of incentives for the parties' activity level. Id. at 25, 33-40.
64. Daniel Friedmann, Unjust Enrichment, Pursuance of Self-Interest, and the Limits of
Free Riding, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 831, 846-47 (2003).
65. Gordon, supra note 54, at 465-69; cf. Stephen A. Smith, Justifying the Law of Unjust
Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2177, 2183 (2001) ("To avoid liability for unjust enrichment, the
'activity' which would have to be given up is life itself.").
66. See also HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 147-48 (2004)
(critically discussing Levmore's analysis); Hershovitz, supra note 54, at 1150-60 (same).
67. Porat, supra note 6, at 190-202, 205-09.
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divergence from the prevailing legal reasoning and judicial rhetoric. 68
At the same time, the assertion that the key to the puzzle is the
"underlying moral asymmetry" between harms and benefits6 9 does not
take one very far as long as it is not corroborated by a substantive
moral theory.
Be that as it may, my aim here is neither to assess the
competing explanations for the tort/unjust-enrichment asymmetry nor
to refute them. o Rather, at this point I wish to highlight the
compatibility between this asymmetry and the asymmetry posited by
the notions of baselines and loss aversion. PT posits that losses loom
larger than gains and that the status quo ante (the parties' positions
prior to the infliction of the loss or the bestowing of the benefit) is the
natural reference point for framing changes as losses or gains.
Therefore, a person who suffered a loss due to another person's
behavior is much more likely to seek redress for her loss than a person
whose behavior yielded an unrequested benefit for some beneficiary,
unaccompanied by a corresponding loss to the benefactor. At least
initially, the injured party is likely to view the legal redress as a
remedy for her loss. In contrast, the recipient's refusal to pay for what
she received is more likely to be perceived by the benefactor as not
obtaining a gain.
Similarly, from the viewpoint of a disinterested arbiter, such as
a judge or a legislator, compensating the injured person for her
strongly felt loss is likely to be seen as much more pressing than
entitling the provider of the nonbargained benefit to recover for the
less strongly felt unattained benefit.
In addition to the basic asymmetry between tort and unjust
enrichment, loss aversion may plausibly explain other aspects of
unjust-enrichment law. For one thing, it seems relevant to cases
where unjust enrichment primarily serves as a substitute for a tort
action, as the victim's loss is undeterminable or unverifiable.7 1 In fact,
some legal systems condition the benefactor's right to restitution on
her incurring a loss, and others view the absence of such a loss as a
possible reason to exempt the recipient from the duty of restitution.7 2
68. Hershovitz, supra note 54, at 1159-60 ("[T]he language of the law is not the language
associated with the model of costs.").
69. Id. at 1160.
70. I will, however, flesh out the "moral asymmetry" assertion in infra Part III.B.
71. See, e.g., Grosskopf, supra note 56, at 1996-2018 (analyzing the advantages of benefit-
based remedies for infringements of legal rules that regulate competition without conferring
positive entitlements).
72. For the former position, see, for example, KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ,
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 548 (1998) (explaining that under French law, the first
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Loss aversion may possibly explain more specific doctrines of unjust-
enrichment law, such as the rescue cases. When a benefactor acts to
protect the life, health, or property of a recipient in circumstances
where bargaining is not feasible, she is entitled to restitution.7 3 The
fact that the benefactor protects the recipient from a loss, rather than
providing her with a gain, may explain this exception to the general
denial of restitution for intentionally conferred, unrequested benefits.
B. Constitutional Property Law: Takings vs. Givings
Under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 74
No comparable clause limits the government's power to confer
property to private individuals or entities or requires it to charge
recipients for such benefits. 75 Not only has nobody proposed to fill this
constitutional "gap" by a corresponding "givings clause," quite the
opposite is true: there is a prevailing notion that governmental
conferring of (even disproportionate) benefits is not objectionable and
problematic in the same way as takings. 76
As a matter of fact, various mechanisms are used in the United
States and elsewhere to charge private recipients of property rights
and regulatory benefits (such as expansion of building rights by
zoning ordinances) for such givings. 77 In practically all legal systems,
however, the statutory and judicial safeguards against unjustified or
requirement of the general enrichment claim is that the defendant's gain resulted from the
plaintiffs impoverishment). For the latter position, see, for example, Unjust Enrichment Law,
5739-1979, SH No. 2192 (Isr.) ('The Court may exempt the beneficiary from the whole or part of
the duty of restitution.. . if... the receipt of the benefit did not involve a loss to the benefactor.
. . .'). For the claim that the entire body of unjust-enrichment law "address[es] those gaining
practices (and only those practices) which are related in one way or another to harm suffered by
others," see Kit Barker, The Nature of Responsibility for Gain: Gain, Harm, and Keeping the Lid
on Pandora's Box, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 146,
152 (Robert Chambers et al. eds., 2009).
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 20, 21 (2011).
74. See generally STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 4 (4th ed. 2009); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 587-613 (2d ed. 1988).
75. The same is true of other constitutions. For a comparative analysis of the constitutional
protection of property rights, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 97-197 (2006).
76. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. &
MARY L REV. 1849, 1884 (2007) ("Standing alone, the conferring of disproportionate benefits
would not give rise to much objection."); Id. at 1884 n. 151 ("Takings of rights (here property) are
regarded as problematic in a way that givings are not.").
77. For a comprehensive comparative survey of such mechanisms, see WINDFALIS FOR
WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 311-488 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J.
Misczynski eds., 1978).
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uncompensated takings are more effective than the safeguards against
unjustified or uncharged-for givings, the judicial scrutiny of takings is
stricter than that of givings, and the takings scholarship is much more
elaborate than that dealing with governmental givings.78
Against this backdrop, Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky have powerfully argued that this disparate treatment
of governmental takings and givings is incompatible with the
pertinent efficiency, distribution, and fairness considerations. They
then offered a conceptual framework for the analysis of givings,
parallel to the analysis of takings. Finally, they proposed a detailed
set of policy considerations that should underlie the legal regulation of
governmental givings and charging of recipients, taking into account
such factors as the reversibility of the giving, the identifiability of
recipients, and the latter's option to reject the benefit.79 Subsequent
studies employed the concept of givings to analyze various legal
issues.8 0 These studies, too, criticize the takings/givings distinction
and urge a system of charges for governmental givings.
It is perhaps not surprising that neither Bell and
Parchomovsky nor their followers have offered much in the way of
explanation or justification for the extant legal asymmetry. A close
examination of the literature nevertheless reveals some attempts to
provide such explanations, while other alleged justifications may be
gleaned from the arguments countered by critics of the existing
asymmetry.
Apparently, the most obvious explanation is that "losers cry for
compensation while winners never cry for taxation.""' Yet, this
explanation is partial at best. There is typically no difference between
takings and givings in terms of the number of people who stand to
78. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 7, at 549; Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L REV. 509, 554 (1986) (noting that despite the "strong
similarity between gains and losses, virtually all investigations of [changes in governmental
policy] have ignored the issue of how to treat windfall gains").
79. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 7. A symmetric economic analysis of governmental
takings and givings in the broadest sense of these terms was offered earlier by Louis Kaplow.
Kaplow, supra note 78. While Bell and Parchomovsky conclude that givings should be charged
just as takings are compensated, Kaplow claims that neither one should be
compensatedlcharge& Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 7, at 577-89, 618; Kaplow, supra note
78, at 550-60, 615-16.
80. See, e.g., Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private
Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARv. ENVTL L. REV. 295 (2003) (exploring the feasibility of
using givings-recapture mechanisms to promote effective land use management on coastal
floodplains); Lindsay Warren Bowen, Jr., Note, Givings and the Next Copyright Deferment, 77
FORDHAM L REV. 809 (2008) (proposing a givings-based solution to the copyright extension
debate).
81. Kaplow, supra note 78, at 555.
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gain/lose from any governmental action or in terms of the magnitude
of such losses/gains. On both sides, the impact of governmental actions
may be concentrated or dispersed, large or small.8 2 Thus, one could
have expected that those who do not receive the benefits would call for
taxing or otherwise charging the winners. Moreover, since the
government usually needs greater resources for its activities, one
could expect it to charge givings as an effective and fair means for
raising revenue.8 3 Indeed, when benefit recipients are few, the many
nonrecipients may encounter difficulties in getting organized to stake
their claim for charging recipients.84 However, this collective action
problem does not explain why the framers of the Constitution treated
takings and givings so differently, nor does it necessarily explain why
the government does not effectively charge recipients of benefits, at
least when the latter are not the government's allies or supporters.
Another argument against a "givings clause" is that the
Constitution should focus on political power and stability. Since the
"foremost danger is that political factions will use the power of the
state to eliminate or punish their enemies," it is more important to
scrutinize takings.8 5 On this logic, laws against corruption and
targeted constitutional provisions against self-dealing suffice to
address the problem of givings.8 6 This argument is hardly persuasive.
Whether one assumes, as public choice theory ordinarily does, that
political actors are rational maximizers of their own self-interest or
adopts a more nuanced portrayal of public officials, one can safely
presume that uncharged-for givings pose a potentially greater problem
than uncompensated takings. Presumably, political actors are more
interested in benefiting themselves and their supporters than in
punishing their opponents, and they are more susceptible to effective
lobbying by rent-seekers than by people who primarily wish to harm
others.87
82. Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 967-71.
83. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 78, at 555-56 (discussing compensation for losses (takings) and
taxations for gains (givings) from the government's perspective).
84. The seminal study of the collective action problem is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPs (1965). On the importance of
group size, see id. at 53-65.
85. Henry A. Span, Public Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40
IDAHO L REV. 11, 99 (2003).
86. Id. (concluding that the problem of givings is not sufficiently related to political power
and stability to merit treatment by the Constitution).
87. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 7, at 553, 593-96 (discussing rent-seeking in the
political process); Reza Dibadj, Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1041,
1063-73 (2003) (describing the tenets of public choice theory and its critique); see also Gary S.
Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON.
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Similarly problematic is the claim that limitations on
uncharged-for givings are more difficult to delineate than those on
uncompensated takings.88  As Bell and Parchomovsky have
demonstrated, there is considerable resemblance between the
challenges facing both tasks, and comparable criteria may be used in
both contexts.8 9
Considerations of efficiency and fairness also seem to militate
against the takings/givings asymmetry. From an efficiency standpoint,
the government should internalize both the costs and benefits of its
activities so as to avoid the inefficiencies associated with negative and
positive externalities. 90 From a fairness perspective, it is unfair that a
few people will be enriched at the expense of the public at large, just
as it is unfair that a few people will be required to bear the public
burden.91
All of this makes the current asymmetry all the more
mysterious.9 2 Or does it? Henry Span has argued in this context that
"the endowment effect and the declining marginal utility of wealth
suggest that protecting what one has is a stronger incentive for
transgressing the bounds of democratic politics than is acquiring new
wealth."93 While one may question the seriousness of the risk of
landowners transgressing the limits of democracy and doubt that
diminishing marginal utility can account for the different ways people
perceive gains and losses, Span seems to be on the right track in
alluding to the endowment effect. Assuming that people ordinarily
view the status quo as the pertinent benchmark, when the
government takes their property or otherwise adversely affects its
value, such taking is rather painful and causes considerable
resentment. In contrast, when the government benefits other people,
it is more likely to be perceived as an unobtained gain, rather than as
a loss, or to be disregarded altogether. Hence, it is considerably less
painful and a lesser cause of resentment.
As in other contexts, the distinction is not hermetic. If the
thing taken is something that was previously given by the
371 (1983) (formulating a general theory of rent-seeking by pressure groups in the political
arena).
88. Span, supra note 85, at 99.
89. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 7, at 590-608.
90. Id. at 580-84.
91. Id. at 554.
92. The assertion that "[t]akings infringe the property rights of owners [while] [g]ivings...
do not, by their nature, infringe anyone's rights," Hershovitz, supra note 54, at 1186, hardly
resolves the mystery, at least as long as it is not corroborated by a substantive moral theory. See
supra text accompanying note 69. Hershovitz offers no such theory.
93. Span, supra note 85, at 99 (references omitted).
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government, one may perhaps view it as belonging in the domain of
(avoided) gains. If everyone but me gets something, I may view the
position of everyone else as the reference point-and experience my
not receiving it as a loss. The smaller the number of other people who
get the benefit and the greater the distance and dissimilarity between
the agent and the recipients, the less one would expect such a shift of
reference point. Interestingly, the issue of the pertinent baseline is a
recurring theme in takings and givings debates. 94 Nevertheless, the
salience of the status quo as the natural reference point seems to
provide the best explanation for the takings/givings asymmetry. 95
C. Remedies for Breach of Contract: Reliance, Expectation, Restitution,
and Disgorgement
In the past decades, the analysis of contract remedies has been
dominated by Lon Fuller and William Perdue's classification of the
"interests" protected by remedies for breach of contract: expectation,
reliance, and restitution.96 As ordinarily conceived, the expectation
interest focuses on the injured party and is forward-looking in the
sense that it aims at putting her in the same position that she would
have been in had the contract been fully performed. The reliance
interest also focuses on the injured party, yet it is backward-looking in
the sense that it strives to put her in the position that she would have
been in had she not made the contract in the first place. The
restitution interest, on the other hand, focuses on the breaching party.
It is backward-looking in that it aims to put the breaching party in a
position similar to the one that she would have been in had no
94. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 74, at 607-09 (discussing the pertinent baseline concept);
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 7, at 552, 612-14 (discussing baselines for givings and
takings); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L REV. 873 (1987) (analyzing and
questioning the implicit assumptions regarding the baseline against which the constitutionality
of governmental actions, including takings, should be assessed). A more specific context in which
the pertinent baseline has been recurrently debated is the distinction between harm-preventing
and benefit-conferring regulation, used to delineate the scope of the takings clause. See, e.g.,
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See generally supra note 24; infra notes 248,
264 and accompanying text.
95. Another puzzling characteristic of the law of takings that may be explained through the
notion of loss aversion is the considerably stronger protection afforded to existing uses, compared
to future ones. See Christopher Serkin, Fxisting Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1222, 1267-70 (2009) (mentioning loss aversion as a possible explanation for this
phenomenon, yet finding it on the whole indefensible); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Loss Aversion and
Involuntary Transfers of Title, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERsPECTIVES 331,
341-46 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K Braun eds., 1995) (discussing Supreme Court's
treatment of takings that induce future losses).
96. L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1),
46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936).
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contract been made. Forcing the party in breach to return the benefits
that she obtained from the injured party attains this goal. 97
This classification is analytically incomplete since it disregards
the possibility of remedies designed to put the breaching party in the
position that she would have been in had she performed the contract.
This goal typically can be achieved by disgorging the breaching party
of any benefit that she gained by breaching the contract, even if that
benefit was not drawn from anything that she received from the
injured party. It is thus conventionally labeled the disgorgement
interest.98 The following table highlights the basic characteristics of
the four interests99:
TABLE 1. THE FOUR INTERESTS
Injured Party Breaching Party
Backward-looking Reliance Restitution
Forward-looking Expectation Disgorgement
The prevailing convention is that the law primarily protects
the injured party's expectation interest.100 This is sometimes done by
awarding specific performance but more often through damages. The
reliance measure of damages is sometimes used instrumentally as a
minimal approximation of the injured party's expectation interest
when the latter is unverifiable.101 Under some circumstances, the
injured party may opt for remedies protecting her restitution
97. For a more detailed exposition of the three interests, see 24 RICHARD A. LORD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS BY SAMUEL WILLISTON 20-44 (Danny R. Vei]eux ed.,
Thomson West 4th ed. 2002).
98. On this interest, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 257-58 (5th
ed. 2008) (discussing the incentives created by disgorgement); JAMES EDELMAN, GAIN-BASED
DAMAGES: CONTRACT, TORT, EQUITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 149-89 (2002)
(comprehensively analyzing the issue from comparative and normative perspectives); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 559 (2006) (arguing
that contract law should and to some extent does protect the disgorgement interest); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 70-84
(2003) (critically analyzing disgorgement remedies from the standpoint of corrective justice).
99. Cf. Avery Katz, Reflections on Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, 21 MICH. J.L. REFORM 541, 545 (1988).
100. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, 149-50, 190 (3d ed. 2004);
LORD, supra note 97, at 20-30; G.H. TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: A
COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT 82-83 (1988).
101. Reliance damages are also awarded when the cause of action is not truly contractual,
but rather tort or tort-like, as in some cases of promissory estoppel. FARNSWORTH, supra note
100, at 279-88.
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interest. 1 2 In contrast, disgorgement remedies are not ordinarily
available for breach of contract. 1 0 3
On the normative level, there is an ongoing debate as to which
interests are most worthy of protection. Some argue that contract
remedies should primarily or even exclusively protect the promisee's
expectation interest,10 4 while others claim that the law should (and
does) content itself with protecting reliance and restitution.10 5
Interestingly, none of the major theories of contract law, such as the
will theory, economic efficiency, and corrective justice, unequivocally
supports any of the interests.10 6
For the present purpose, I would like to focus, first, on the
structuring of the doctrine and the normative debate around the
interests described above and, second, on the marginality of the
disgorgement interest. Regarding the first issue, Richard Craswell has
powerfully argued that Fuller and Perdue's tripartite classification (as
well as, impliedly, the quadripartite classification described above)
should be abandoned. Whether one's perspective on contract remedies
is instrumental (such as the economic approach) or noninstrumental
(such as the liberal theory of contract as promise), "there is no reason
to think that the remedy that best serves the chosen substantive goal
102. See generally 3 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES 159-70, 178-89 (1993);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 100, at 323-38; Eyal Zamir, The Missing Interest: Restoration of the
Contractual Equivalence, 93 VA. L. REV. 59, 79-85 (2007).
103. DOBBS, supra note 102, at 1170-78; EDELMAN, supra note 98; FARNSWORTH, supra note
100, at 338-83; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
(2011) (proposing to extend the availability of disgorgement as a remedy for opportunistic
breach); Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 565-66, 578-98 (arguing that the disgorgement interest is
actually protected more than it is usually realized). Israeli law is exceptional in this regard. See
F.H. 20/82 Adras Bldg. Material Ltd. v. Harlow & Jones GmbH, 42(1) PD 221 (1988), translated
in Law Report, RESTITUTION L REV., Autumn 1995, at 235 (1995) (holding that plaintiff is
entitled to recover all profits gained by the defendant as a result of contract breach); Hanoch
Dagan, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law Theory, 1
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 115 (2000) (critically discussing the Adras case). However, even in Israel,
while the disgorgement interest is in principle protected in breach-of-contract cases,
disgorgement remedies are hardly ever sought or awarded.
104. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 17-27 (1981) (grounding this claim in a theory of contract as promise); Andrew S.
Gold, Contract as Property, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 46 (2009) (basing expectation remedies on a
theory of contract as transfer of ownership in the promisor's future actions); Daniel Markovits,
Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1503-14 (2004) (basing this argument on a
theory of contract as collaboration); Steven Shavell, Damages Measures for Breach of Contract,
11 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980) (favoring expectation damages from an economic efficiency
perspective).
105. P.S. ATIYAH, CONTRACT, PROMISES, AND LAW (1981) (developing a theory of contractual
liability based on restitution and reliance); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 96, at 53-66 (advocating
the reliance measure of damages on the basis of notions of corrective justice).
106. EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY 294-301, 305-10
(2010); Craswell, supra note 8, at 106-36.
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will necessarily coincide with one of Fuller and Perdue's three
'interests.' "107 In fact, claims Craswell, both instrumental and
noninstrumental theories may endorse a measure of damages that
would lie anywhere on the real number line.10 8 He then argues that
the common classification is not even helpful as a descriptive
framework. Sometimes, courts award remedies that do not fit neatly
into any of the recognized interests. 0 9 At the same time, judgments
that purportedly aim to protect the same interest often provide the
injured party with such markedly dissimilar remedies that grouping
them under the same category is almost meaningless. 110
And yet, a decade later, courts, scholars, and legal educators
keep referring to the different interests as useful organizing principles
of contract remedies. This continued resort to the conventional
classification may be due to flaws in Craswell's analysis."' However,
there seems to be a more fundamental reason. As Craswell concedes,
legal reasoning cannot function without some points of reference.
Neither making a very long list of all conceivable remedies without
any organizing principle nor authorizing the courts to choose the most
appropriate measure of damages in each and every case based on all
pertinent policy considerations are viable options for the law." 2 PT
teaches us that meaningful baselines are essential to people's
assessments and decisions, and legal decisions are no exception. Thus,
Craswell might be right in arguing that from an efficiency standpoint
or some other normative perspective, the optimal measure of damages,
all things considered, may be, say, "[sixty-three] percent of expectation
interest."" 3 Yet, at least psychologically, he is wrong in arguing that
aiming at one hundred percent of the expectation (or any other)
measure "is no less arbitrary" than aiming at the sixty-three percent
of expectation measure of damages. Contrary to sixty-three percent of
107. Craswell, supra note 8, at 107.
108. Id. at 110, 114, 116; cf. Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the
Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489 (1989) (arguing that promise-based theories
of contract law "have little or no relevance to those parts of contract law that govern the proper
remedies for breach").
109. See also Zamir, supra note 102 (identifying restoration of the contractual equivalence as
a fifth goal of contract remedies).
110. Craswell, supra note 8, at 136-54.
111. For recent counterarguments, see, for example, DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO
CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 89-100 (2003); Markovits, supra note 104,
at 1491-514.
112. Craswell, supra note 8, at 155-56.
113. Id. at 111, 117.
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whatever interest, one hundred percent is a natural focal point.114
Thus, it is much more likely to serve as a reference point.
Having recognized the importance of reference points, I now
turn to the marginal status of the disgorgement interest. The notion of
loss aversion is helpful here, too. From the perspective of PT, both
expectation and reliance are conceivable points of reference for
assessing an injured party's losses due to a breach. 115 While Fuller and
Perdue viewed the injured party's position prior to contracting as the
natural baseline, 116 this perception is not at all self-evident.1 7 Just as
naturally, one may view the outcomes of breach as a deviation from
the injured party's position had the contract been performed." 8 For
example, when a seller delivers defective goods or does not deliver
goods on time, the reference point may well be the buyer's position had
she received conforming goods on time. Even when making a contract
entails no opportunity costs (that is, one would not have pursued an
alternative course of action had she not made the contract) and before
anything is performed under the contract, repudiation by the other
party ordinarily causes disappointment and displeasure. Making a
promise or a contract, and then breaking it, is more deleterious than
not making the promise or the contract in the first place, even absent
any reliance or enrichment. A promise/contract creates expectations of
performance. It changes the promisee's point of reference so that
114. The notion of focal points was introduced in THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLICT (1960). While Schelling's primary concern was coordination without communication,
he also discussed the role of focal points in explicit bargaining, id. at 67-74. For a brief summary
of game theory studies of focal points, see Maarten C.W. Janssen, Focal Points, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 150 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
115. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
116. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 96, at 54 ("[Tlhe plaintiff has in reliance on the promise
of the defendant changed his position .... Our object is to put him in as good a position as he
was in before the promise was made.').
117. The same questionable perception also characterizes Cohen and Knetsch's more recent
analysis. See Cohen & Knetsch, supra note 5, at 753-56 ("While lost profits are said to be
recoverable in contract law, it is difficult to defend the proposition that the expectation interest of
a non-breaching party is recognized in contract actions in the same fashion as are actual
losses.").
118. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 8, at 125-27; Zamir, supra note 102, at 108-10. Fuller
and Perdue actually recognized this when asserting that there is a "psychological" explanation
for why the law protects the expectation interest: 'Whether or not he has actually changed his
position because of the promise, the promisee has formed an attitude of expectancy such that a
breach of the promise causes him to feel that he has been 'deprived' of something which was
'his.' " Fuller & Perdue, supra note 96, at 57. For justifications of the expectation measure of
damages resting on notions of corrective justice, see, for example, Peter Benson, The Unity of
Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 118, 127-38 (Peter Benson ed.,
2001); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-18 (1989);
Weinrib, supra note 98, at 62-70.
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nonperformance is more likely to be perceived as a loss, rather than
merely as an unobtained gain.119
As for the disgorgement interest, while there is a relatively
broad consensus regarding the general unavailability of the
disgorgement relief, the soundness of this position is hotly debated.
From an economic point of view, a disgorgement remedy would
arguably eliminate the incentive for an efficient breach and is thus
undesirable. 120 But this conclusion is too hasty. Even if the third party
is unlikely to approach the buyer, the seller may still negotiate a
discharge of the original contract with the buyer, thus facilitating its
efficient nonperformance. Granted, such negotiation may be costly due
to the bilateral monopoly situation.121 However, the cost of resolving a
dispute resulting from a breach of contract and of judicially
determining the damages for the breach is likely to be higher.122
Entitling the injured party to disgorgement remedies need not thwart
an efficient breach for yet another reason. As Richard Brooks has
pointed out, one way to incentivize the promisor to efficiently perform
or breach is by affording the promisee a choice between performance
and disgorgement.123
Deontological moral theories are all the more likely to endorse
disgorgement, thereby expressively and practically strengthening the
notion that a promisor should keep her promises. 124 This claim, too,
119. Cf. Fredrick E. Vars, Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action: Paradox or Paradigm?, in
RACE VERSUS CLASS: THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 73, 82-89 (Carol M. Swain ed.,
1996) (describing an experiment indicating that while giving a benefit that was promised to some
people to others is less objectionable than taking such a benefit from people who already received
it and giving it to others, it is considerably more objectionable than giving priority to some people
over others in allocating a benefit and than allocating a benefit to some people only, rather than
to others). For psychological studies establishing that expectations are likely to affect people's
reference points, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Sidney W. Delong, The Efficiency of Disgorgement as a Remedy for Breach of
Contract, 22 IND. L. REV. 737, 742-45 (1989).
121. Id. at 744-45.
122. William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 634
(1999) (contending that "the transaction costs of negotiating a release are typically lower than
the assessment costs of establishing damages at trial"); Friedmann, supra note 118, at 6-7
(asserting that negotiating a dispute is hardly costless, but any resulting litigation could be
extremely expensive).
123. Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568 (2006).
For a powerful refutation of the claim that disgorgement is inefficient, see Eisenberg, supra note
98, at 570-78.
124. Adras, supra note 103, at 241 (Judge S. Levin explaining that Israeli law's perception of
contract breach as wrongdoing is incompatible with an economic analysis of law);id. at 272
(rejecting the notion of efficient breach, Judge Barak proclaims: "Promise keeping is the basis of
our life, as a society and a nation."); Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 578-81; Daniel Friedmann,
Restitution of Benefits Obtained through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a
Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 515 (1980) ("[L]imitation of a plaintiff's remedy to damages tends
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may, however, be challenged. If contracting parties typically prefer
that under such circumstances the seller would be free to breach the
contract subject to the payment of expectation damages, then even
deontological theories need not object to a default rule denying the
buyer's entitlement to disgorgement. 125
A second-order consideration against disgorgement remedies
lies in the difficulty of enforcing them. The injured party usually
possesses the information and evidence necessary to establish her
profits had the contract been performed (expectation) and her
monetary position had she not made the contract (reliance). The facts
necessary to establish one's restitution interest are also quite
observable and verifiable because the injured party knows what she
gave the breacher. In contrast, when the injured party sues for
disgorgement, her claim typically refers to the extra profits that the
breacher made, or the losses she cut, by breaching the contract-and
this information may be unknown to the injured party. 126
Consequently, so the argument goes, disgorgement remedies are not
something that promisees would ordinarily be willing to pay for ex
ante. 127
This argument is not conclusive. Even when the injured party
sues for her expectation or reliance losses, she has to establish that
these losses were foreseeable from the breacher's perspective at the
time of contracting.128 If the injured party's losses are observable from
the breacher's point of view (and were so all along), it is unclear why
the breacher's gains from the breach should necessarily be
unobservable from the injured party's perspective. 129 Moreover, while
to trivialize the importance of contractual obligations .. )..'); see also Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007) (arguing that by limiting
the injured party's remedies to expectation damages, contract law does not accommodate the
needs of moral agency).
125. For a deontological objection to disgorgement as a standard remedy for breach, see, for
example, Weinrib, supra note 98. See also Dagan, supra note 103, at 118-25 (arguing that the
inherent value of promise keeping is neutral to the desirability of disgorgement remedies).
126. FARNSWORTH, supra note 100, at 342-43; cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein,
Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1823, 1845 (2009) (discussing the same concern
in the context of remedies for trespass).
127. Dagan, supra note 103, at 142-46.
128. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 100, at 255-68 (discussing unforseeability as a limitation
on assessments of damages); TREITEL, supra note 100, at 150-62 (discussing foreseeability).
129. Arguably, an injured party entitled to disgorgement remedies would also be entitled to
pretrial discovery rights that would imperil the breacher's secrecy interest-a prospect that may
affect the desirability of these remedies. Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy
Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885 (2000) (discussing this interest in the
complementary case of expectation damages). However, the fact that the law imposes
disgorgement remedies against trustees implies that these difficulties are not insurmountable.
See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
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the alleged difficulty to enforce the disgorgement remedy decreases
the promisee's willingness to pay for it ex ante, it concomitantly
decreases what the promisor would ask for it, knowing that this
remedy is unlikely to be enforced against her. Hence, an agreement is
feasible.
This succinct description of the debate suffices to demonstrate
that the justifications thus far proposed for the marginality of
disgorgement remedies are, to say the least, contestable. 130 Melvin
Eisenberg, who advocates broader recognition of disgorgement
remedies, considers several explanations for the rarity of cases in
which such remedies are actually sought and awarded.131 Among other
things, the injured party's loss is often greater than the breacher's
gain and hence expectation damages are more attractive. At other
times, the injured party is entitled to specific performance, thereby
preventing the promisor from making a gain through breach.
However, these arguments do not fully explain extant law. Breaches
in which the breacher's observable and verifiable gains are greater
than the injured party's verifiable losses are probably much more
common than reflected in the case law. Similarly, specific performance
is often unobtainable, and even when it is available, disgorgement
remedies may be superior. This would be the case, for example, where
the opportunity to make the extra profit is only available to the
promisor, and the costs of renegotiation are prohibitive.
Here too, the notion of loss aversion provides a crucial insight.
If, as is very plausibly the case, promisees do not ordinarily view
promisors' profits (including avoided losses) from the breach as
something that they have lost, then not getting these profits is
considerably less painful than not getting back what they gave the
breacher (restitution), the costs they incurred in performing the
contract (reliance), and their own losses due to the breach
(expectation). Consequently, disgorgement remedies are much less
likely to be sought, and legal decisionmakers are much less likely to
award them. 132
130. See also E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement
Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1343-50 (1985) (providing causation
arguments against protecting the disgorgement interest); Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 566-70
(critiquing the causation arguments).
131. Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 597-99.
132. Breach of contract is not the only context in which an injured person's loss is often
accompanied by a gain to the injurer and in which legal relief is much more often based on the
injured's loss than on the injurer's gain. See Grosskopf, supra note 56, at 1994-95 ("The
protection of entitlements is as old as the law itself. . . . One of the prominent products of this
extensive legal discourse is the preference for harm-based remedies over benefit-based remedies,
as far as protecting entitlements is concerned.'); supra notes 56, 71 and accompanying text.
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More speculatively, the losses/gains distinction may help to
explain why disgorgement remedies, which are not ordinarily
available for breach of contract, are available against a trustee or a
fiduciary that breached her duty of loyalty. 13 3 Since the trust property
is legally and conventionally perceived as something that the
beneficiary already has, if only in equity, rather than as something
she is entitled to receive from the trustee, both beneficiaries and legal
decisionmakers are more likely to view the illicit profits made by the
trustee as belonging to the domain of the beneficiary's losses, rather
than to the realm of her unobtained gains. Following the same logic, it
is unsurprising that the greatest supporters of disgorgement remedies
for breach of contract also adhere to the theory of contractual rights as
akin to property rights. 34 If one views the formation of a contract as
akin to an instantaneous transfer of property-like entitlements,
then-as in the case of trust-it is natural to view the breacher's gains
from appropriating these entitlements as depriving the promisee of
something that she already had.
D. Civil-Rights Law: Affirmative Action
Affirmative action is taking positive steps to increase the
representation of minorities and women in the workplace, in
education, and in other areas from which they have historically been
excluded.135 Affirmative action is politically, morally, and legally
controversial.136 An interesting aspect of the debate has to do with its
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206, cmt. a (1959); FARNSWORTH, supra note 100,
at 344-52 (discussing the roots of the disgorgement principle in the fiduciary context); J.C.
SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 116-19 (1981); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF.
L. REV. 795, 829 (1983) (illustrating the principle by describing breaches by a corporate agent
and a CIA agent).
134. See Friedmann, supra note 124, at 515 & n.54 (arguing that the issue underlying the
debate over disgorgement remedies is whether "the promisee [is] 'entitled' to [the contractual
performance] in such a way that if this performance is withheld, appropriated, or otherwise
'taken,' the promisee can be regarded as having been deprived of an interest that 'belonged' to
him"; and adding that "[tihere is substantial support for the view that contractual rights are a
form of property"); Friedmann, supra note 118, at 4 (equating efficient breach with "efficient
theft'); see also Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 579 (citing Friedmann approvingly).
135. E.g., Robert Fullinwider, Affirmative Action, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entriest
affirmative-action; Faye J. Crosby & Diana I. Cordova, Words Worth of Wisdom" Toward an
Understanding of Affirmative Action, in SEX, RACE, AND MERIT DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
IN EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT 13 (Faye J. Crosby & Cheryl VanDeVeer eds., 2000) (discussing
different meanings of the term). For a general survey of affirmative-action law, see 2 BARBARA T.
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 2483-702 (4th ed. 2007).
136. See generally SEX, RACE, AND MERIT, supra note 135; Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action", 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063,
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framing. Affirmative action plans are ordinarily conceived as
benefiting some people while adversely affecting others (those who
would have received the benefit absent the affirmative-action policy).
Advocates of these plans argue, however, that they do not inflict losses
on nonminority people but rather reduce the unjust enrichment of the
majority due to prior discriminatory practices. 137 Tellingly, this
argument seeks to reduce the objection to affirmative action by
framing its effects on the nonminority group as belonging to the realm
of gains, thus making these policies less painful.
Rather than delving into the doctrinal complexity of
affirmative action or the heated normative debate it has generated, I
wish to spotlight one feature that is noticeably uncontroversial. A
common denominator of practically all affirmative-action policies is
that they refer to benefits that people do not yet have. When
affirmative-action policies are instituted at a university or in the
workplace, they mandate that one person rather than another will
gain admission or secure a job. They very rarely, if ever, dictate that
an employee who already occupies a certain position, or who has been
legitimately appointed to it, should vacate her position for another. 138
The same holds true for students who already attend a university or
have been admitted, as well as in contexts such as governmental
procurements. This feature of affirmative action is equally
1064 (2006) ("Since its inception in the 1960s, affirmative action has produced volumes of moral,
legal, and policy arguments both to justify and undermine its very existence.') (citation omitted);
Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust" A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (1986) (describing the controversy over affirmative action as "the most
salient current battlefront in the ongoing conflic' over race relations); Jed Rubenfeld,
Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997); Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present
and Future, 20 YALE L. & POLY REV. 1, 2 (2002) ("Affirmative action policy is even more divisive
and unsettled today than at its inception thirty years ago.").
137. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484-85 (1980) (Burger, C.J.) (plurality
opinion) ('Moreover, although we may assume that the complaining parties are innocent of any
discriminatory conduct, it was within congressional power to act on the assumption that in the
past some nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the
virtual exclusion of minority firms from these contracting opportunities."); accord Ohio
Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 173 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Fullilove approvingly); Ian
Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, When does Private Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative Action?,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1616-19 (1998) (discussing the "unjust enrichment principle').
138. See, e.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Intl Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 479
(1986) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) (upholding an affirmative-action plan in part because it
"did not require any member of the union to be laid off, and did not discriminate against existing
union members'); City of Richmond v. J.A Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 549 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("[L]ike the federal provision, Richmond's does not interfere with any vested right of
a contractor to a particular contract; instead it operates entirely prospectively. Richmond's
initiative affects only future economic arrangements ..." (citation omitted)).
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characteristic of legal systems where affirmative action is less
controversial. 13 9
Arguably, the difference between affirmative action in hiring
and in layoffs is that the former will "impose a diffuse burden," while
the latter will "impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality
on particular individuals." 140 While intuitively and psychologically
sensible, 141 this argument is not without its problems. The difficulty
lies in the fact that, at the end of the day, there is one particular
nonminority person who would have been hired had the affirmative-
action policy not been in effect.1 42 Loss aversion plausibly provides a
better explanation. Adversely affecting people by not giving them
something, such as the opportunity to study at a certain institution, is
considerably less painful than taking an entitlement away.143 This
perception prevails regardless of whether taking the entitlement from
those who already have it entails greater transaction costs or any
additional losses, such as investments in job-specific skills and
139. See, e.g., State Service (Appointments) Law § 15A(b), (c), 5719-1959, 13 LSI 87 (1959)
(Isr.), available at http://ilo-mirror.library.cornell.edu/public/englis/lemployment/gems/eeo/law/
israellssl.htm (instructing the government to employ affirmative-action plans for the recruitment
and promotion of women, people with disabilities, Arabs, and immigrants from Ethiopia); Equal
Rights for People with Disabilities Law § 9(b), 5758-1998, S.H. No. 1658 p. 152 (Isr.) (providing
for affirmative action in the hiring and promotion of people with disabilities); ANNE PETERS,
WOMEN, QUOTAS, AND CONSTITUTIONS 129-36 (1999) (surveying affirmative-action statutes
referring to women in Germany).
140. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion);
see also City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 549 ("The plurality in Wygant emphasized the importance
of not disrupting the settled and legitimate expectations of innocent parties."); Vars, supra note
119, at 79 (noting that a policy that generates clear losses for an identifiable group of people is
perceived as more objectionable than a policy that does not generate such losses).
141. Cf. Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov, The Singularity Effect of Identified Victims in Separate
and Joint Evaluations, 97 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUvL DECISION PROCESSES 106 (2005)
(surveying the literature on and providing experimental support for the greater willingness to
help identified victims relative to nonidentified ones). Relatedly, from the victim's perspective, it
obviously matters whether she is aware of the fact that she was the one who would have gotten
the benefit.
142. Cf. Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1369-74
(2010) (discussing the pros and cons of considering the visibility-of-victims factor in assessing the
constitutionality of race -conscious interventions).
143. Vars, supra note 119 (basing this claim on general psychological insights and the
findings of a specifically designed survey); see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara
Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987) (affirming a decision to promote a woman rather than a man, the
court noted that "denial of the promotion unsettled no legitimate, firmly rooted expectation on
the part of [the] petitioner. [The] petitioner ... retained his employment with the Agency, at the
same salary and with the same seniority, and remained eligible for other promotions."); Ayres &
Vars, supra note 137, at 1617 n.139 (relying on the notion of loss aversion to support the claim
that "[t]he burden on nonbeneficiaries of an affirmative action plan in contracting may be
perceived by the Court to be relatively light if it does not interfere with settled, legitimate
expectations').
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personal relationships. 144 It may also make the beneficiaries of
affirmative action feel more comfortable with these plans.
From the perspective of loss aversion, the most difficult cases
are those in which it is unclear whether the implementation of an
affirmative-action policy deprives nonminority persons of an
entitlement that they can reasonably perceive as something they
already have or merely allocates an as-yet-unallocated benefit to
members of the minority group. In Cortez III Service Corp. v. NASA, a
contractor who provided services to a federal agency for ten years
under two consecutive contracts was ineligible to compete for a third
contract because it did not meet the newly applied affirmative-action
criteria. 145 The fact that the contractor provided the services for ten
years must have created an expectation to continue providing them;
hence, the effect of the new policy could reasonably be perceived as a
loss. Despite the fact that the contractor had no legal entitlement to
win the new contract, the court issued a preliminary injunction
enjoining the agency to procure the contract.146
Another pertinent example is Ricci v. Destefano.1 47 In this case,
the municipality of New Haven discarded the results of a test designed
to determine firefighters' qualifications for promotion because,
according to the test's outcomes, no black candidates were eligible for
promotion. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled in favor of the
white and Hispanic firefighters who passed the test successfully. 48
The dissent correctly pointed out that the firefighters who scored high
on the test "had no vested right to promotion."' 49 However, given the
procedures and criteria for promotion, it was clear that the promotion
of those who ranked highest on the test was practically guaranteed. As
Justice Kennedy wrote, the "injury" experienced by those firefighters
arose in part from their "high, and justified, expectations" based on
participation in the testing process established by the city. "Many of
the candidates had studied for months, at considerable personal and
financial expense, and thus the injury caused by the City's reliance on
raw racial statistics at the end of the process was all the more
144. Vars, supra note 119, at 92 (analyzing a survey substantiating this claim).
145. 950 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.D.C. 1996).
146. Id. at 363.
147. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). Strictly speaking, the Ricci case did not involve an affirmative-
action plan, yet this issue was explicitly discussed by both the majority and the dissent, and the
relevant questions were closely connected to such plans.
148. Id. at 2664.
149. Id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
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severe. ' ' 150 Even ardent supporters of affirmative action can accept this
line of reasoning. 151
Hence, loss aversion seems to provide the soundest explanation
for a basic feature of affirmative action in the United States and
elsewhere: it only applies to benefits people do not yet have. 152
E. Additional Examples
There are numerous other illustrations of the different legal
treatment of undeserved losses and undeserved gains. This Section
briefly describes some.
Social and economic rights. In many jurisdictions, including
the United States, the scope of constitutional protection afforded to
social and economic rights, such as education and adequate housing, is
far narrower than the constitutional protection of civil and political
rights, such as the rights to life and free speech. The immense
literature on this issue in constitutional and international human-
rights law is often critical of the distinction and its justifications. 153
Indeed, none of the philosophical, institutional, historical, and cultural
150. Id. at 2681 (majority opinion). On this decision, see generally Cheryl I. Harris &
Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58
UCLA L. REV. 73 (2010); Primus, supra note 142 (discussing three different readings of Ricci and
their impact on the disparate impact doctrine).
151. A borderline case of a somewhat different type is Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267 (1986). According to an agreement between a board of education and a teachers union, if
it were to become necessary to lay off teachers, those with the most seniority would be retained;
yet, to preserve the effects of an affirmative hiring policy, the percentage of minority teachers
laid off would not exceed their percentage in the body of employed teachers. Id. at 270-71. As a
result, some nonminority teachers were laid off while minority teachers with less seniority were
retained. Id. This is a borderline case because the nonminority teachers were not laid off to
facilitate the hiring of new minority teachers, but rather to avoid layoffs of minority teachers
already hired. Nonetheless, since the effect of the agreement on the nonminority teachers was
clearly in the domain of losses-losing their jobs-it aroused strong resentment. The Supreme
Court held this policy unconstitutional. Id. at 284.
152. Another manifestation of the role of the gains/losses distinction in the sphere of
antidiscrimination laws has to do with remedies against discriminatory practices or
noncompliance with affirmative-action plans. Courts are far more reluctant to deprive
nonminority persons from a benefit (such as a job) that they have received in good faith than to
prohibit such an inappropriate allocation in the first place. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra
note 135, at 2723-26 ("Since the early days of Title VII, courts generally have refused to displace
an incumbent employee in order to place the discrimination victim immediately in that
position.").
153. See, e.g., CASS R SUNSTEIN, THE SEcOND BILL OF RIGHTS (2004); Ruth Gavison, On the
Relationships between Civil and Political Rights, and Social and Economic Rights, in THE
GLOBALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 23 (Jean-Marc Coicaud et al. eds., 2003); Frank I. Michelman,
The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 INTL J. CONST. L. 13
(2003).
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explanations for the distinction are wholly persuasive. Consider, for
example, the argument that civil and political rights are negative,
merely requiring the state to refrain from certain acts, whereas social
rights entail positive duties and substantial public expenditure.
Contrary to this argument, protecting civil rights very often requires
positive steps and considerable costs. 154 A better explanation for the
lesser protection of social rights-though not necessarily a
justification-rests on the gains/losses distinction. Both when the
state refrains from silencing people or taking their land and when it
takes positive measures to protect free speech against suppression by
other people or protect private property from intruders, it prevents a
loss or harm to the speaker or landowner. At the same time, freedom
of speech does not necessarily require the government to provide
therapy for people with speech impediments or to facilitate access to
communications media. In the sphere of social rights, the provision of
housing or health services is far more likely to be perceived as giving
people something they do not have, and thus it would belong in the
domain of gains.155
Support for this conjecture can be found in cases in which legal
systems that do not generally protect social rights nevertheless impose
positive duties on the government. Thus, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the
Court held that due process forbids the termination of welfare benefits
without a fair hearing.156 In a similar vein, although the constitutional
right to counsel may be perceived as providing the accused with
something that she does not have, it may equally be seen as a
procedural requirement when the state is about to deprive a person of
liberty or property through criminal proceedings.157 Finally, the notion
of a reference point may also help explain why it is that, while the
Constitution does not mandate the provision of economic benefits, once
such benefits are provided to some segments of society, they must be
provided without discrimination to similarly situated persons. 158 The
154. See generally STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999).
155. Cf. Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2297-
308 (1990) (critically discussing the penalty/subsidy distinction in the context of abortion funding
cases).
156. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
157. Bandes, supra note 155, at 2277 (generalizing that "once government has acted to place
a person in danger, it must protect him from that danger'); David Currie, Positive and Negative
Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 873-74 (1986) ("[T]o characterize the right to
assigned counsel as involving an affirmative government duty is to look at only a part of the
transaction. In convicting an individual of crime, the government reaches out to deprive him of
life, liberty, or property by execution, jail, or fine.") (citation omitted).
158. Currie, supra note 157, at 881-82.
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fact that certain benefits are granted to some people may change the
reference point of similarly situated people such that those who do not
receive them experience this as a loss.159
Refugee law. Under international refugee law, once asylum
seekers are physically present within a country, they enjoy various
substantive and procedural rights. Most important, it is forbidden to
expel or return a refugee to a territory where her life or freedom would
be threatened on account of such characteristics as her race, religion,
or political opinions. 160 It is much more controversial, however,
whether and to what extent countries may legitimately prevent
asylum seekers from ever reaching their territory, through visa
requirements, pre-entry clearance, carrier sanctions, and even
interception of vessels beyond the territorial waters.' 6 ' Expelling
physically present people is likely perceived as inflicting a loss, while
denying a visa and other pre-entry devices is seen as not providing a
benefit.
Tax law. The notions of loss aversion and baselines can explain
the popularity of tax subsidies, deductions, and credits. 62 Simple tax
is commonly perceived as a loss to the taxpayer, and tax credits and
deductions are perceived as reducing this loss. From the government's
perspective, credits and deductions are perceived as unobtained
revenue, rather than as direct spending. Consequently, they encounter
less resistance on the part of those who do not receive them and are
less stringently scrutinized. 63
159. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
160. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, Apr. 22, 1951; GUY S. GOODWIN-
GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 355-417 (3d ed. 2007); JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEFS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 279-370 (2005).
161. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (upholding the right to
interdict Haitian refugees while they were still in international waters and return them to Haiti
without an asylum hearing); HATHAWAY, supra note 160, at 307-42 (criticizing the Sale decision,
yet legitimizing visa control practices); see also GOODWIN-WILL & MCADAM supra note 160, at
244-57, 267-77, 369-90 (discussing states' practices and international law responses).
162. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 53, at 1941-42 (describing the role of the tax
expenditure budget as a means to overcome the framing effect of tax exemptions and
deductions); Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditures Analysis, 24 VA.
TAX REV. 797 (2005) (theoretically and experimentally examining the framing effect of outright
payments and tax exemptions).
163. Exposing the various pitfalls of treating tax subsidies differently from direct
governmental spending, Stanley Surrey has successfully advocated the promulgation of "tax
expenditure budgets." See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705
(1970); see also STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985). For a more
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Evidence law. The general standard of proof in civil litigation is
preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the plaintiff prevails if
she discharges the burden of persuasion-that is, if she establishes
her case with a probability exceeding 0.5. When the required standard
of proof is not met by either side, the risk of error is ordinarily borne
by the plaintiff and her claim is dismissed.16
This allocation of risk has been justified on various grounds,
including the elimination of enforcement costs, 165 the discouragement
of unmeritorious and frivolous lawsuits, 166 the principle of civility, 167
the equality principle, 168 and the diminishing marginal utility of
wealth.169 My own justification rests on loss aversion. 170 There is
ample experimental evidence that litigants generally view the status
recent discussion, see David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004); Edward D. Kleinbard, Tax Expenditure Framework
Legislation, 63 NATL TAX J. 353 (2010). On the limited success of the tax expenditure budgets,
see infra notes 245-247 and accompanying text.
164. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 483-86 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006)
[hereainafter MCCORMICK].
165. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 647 (7th ed. 2007) ("[A]n
erroneous judgment for the plaintiff imposes a cost that is avoided when the error goes the other
way-the cost of collecting the judgment.").
166. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 LAW & SOCY REV. 335,
337 (1971) (arguing that it is more important to deter the initiation of frivolous actions than the
raising of frivolous defenses because the latter appear only after the fixed costs of a lawsuit have
been incurred).
167. This principle posits that the law should and does presume that people act in
accordance with serious social norms. Whenever a litigant asserts that her opponent infringed a
serious norm, such as intentionally or negligently harming her or breaching a contract, the
burden of proof should thus be placed on the person making these allegations. Dale A. Nance,
Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARV. J.L & PUB. POLY 647 (1994).
168. This principle rests on the Kantian notion that the law must treat people in general,
and plaintiffs and defendants in particular, with equal respect. Hence, the risk of error should be
allocated between the parties equally. Accordingly, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion
regarding the facts necessary to make out her case, and the defendant bears the burden
regarding her affirmative defenses, such as contributory fault. ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF
EVIDENCE LAW 216, 219-25 (2005).
169. Assuming that plaintiffs' and defendants' levels of wealth are similar on average, the
principle of diminishing marginal utility implies that the loss to the deserving plaintiff who loses
her case is slightly smaller than the loss to the deserving defendant who loses. POSNER, supra
note 165, at 647.
170. Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in
Civil Litigation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1957457 (experimentally examining the actual standard of proof in civil
litigation and possible behavioral explanations for this standard); cf. Alex Stein, Allocating the
Burden of Proof in Sales Litigation: The Law, Its Rationale, a New Theory, and Its Failure, 50 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 335, 343 (1995) (indicating that imposing the burden of proof on the plaintiff
"would be optimal also because taking is generally perceived as more harmful than not giving').
While Stein continues to argue that "[tihis perception can be justified by the diminishing utility
of wealth," he also refers to Tversky and Kahneman's theory. Id.
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quo prior to litigation as the relevant point of reference. 171 The same is
true of jurists. 172 Consequently, plaintiffs are far more likely to view
judicially awarded damages and other relief as belonging in the
domain of gains, and defendants are likely to view a judgment
compelling them to pay damages, transfer property, or the like, as
inflicting a loss. Dismissing the claim whenever there is an
evidentiary tie is therefore compatible with the notion that losses (to
the defendant) loom larger than unobtained gains (to the plaintiff).
While not necessarily discarding other bases for the preponderance of
the evidence rule, this explanation rejects the common assumption
that the disutility of an erroneous judgment is typically similar for
defendants and plaintiffs. 173
Miscellaneous. In criminal law, conduct that the actor believes
to be necessary "to avoid harm or evil" is justifiable under certain
circumstances, but no such justification applies to conduct believed to
be necessary to produce benefit or good.174 Similarly, in contract law,
unexpected events that render performance much more costly for the
promisor, or much less beneficial for the promisee, may discharge the
parties of their duty to perform on grounds of impracticability or
frustration of purpose. 175 No such discharge is available to a promisor
or a promisee who unexpectedly encounters an opportunity to make an
alternative, much more lucrative bargain. The challenge of setting the
baseline for determining what options constitute gains or losses is also
a thorny recurrent issue whenever the law distinguishes between
threats and offers, as in the context of negotiating divorce agreements
171. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 51, at 128-30 (studying litigants' decisions concerning
settlements); Zamir & Ritov, supra note 30, at 268-69 (studying clients' choices of attorneys' fee
arrangements).
172. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 164, at 474 ('The burdens of pleading and proof with
regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to the plaintiff who generally seeks to
change the present state of affairs ... ").
173. See, e.g., MICHAEL FINKEISTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES IN THE
APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICs To LEGAL PROBLEMS 67 (1978)
(stating that, "at least with respect to most types of civil cases' the premise that "the burden of
an error is deemed to be the same for both parties" is "clearly correct"); STEIN, supra note 168, at
148 (arguing that "normally" in civil litigation "false positive and false negative errors are
equally harmful," yet whenever this is not the case, the decision rule should derive from the
disutility differential).
174. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1995). While describing the distinction between avoiding
harm or evil and furthering societal interests as "questionable" and advocating its abandonment
(thus pointing to yet another gains/losses puzzle), Paul Robinson concedes that "virtually the
entire body of case law on this defense involves the avoidance of harm." 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 46, 49 (1984).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261-72 (1981).
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and other contracts allegedly made under duress. 176 Finally, in civil
procedure, courts are far more willing to issue preliminary injunctions
that preserve the status quo than preliminary injunctions that disrupt
or alter it.177 This tendency is compatible with loss aversion because
people are loath to depart from the status quo when doing so may
result in either gains or losses.
This Part analyzed several examples of fundamentally
different legal treatment of seemingly similar cases in private and
public law, as well as some basic rules of procedural and substantive
law that seem to be puzzling in terms of both efficiency and fairness.
It critically surveyed existing attempts to explain these asymmetries
and puzzles. It then argued that they are all best (or at least better)
explained as reflecting the psychological notions of baselines and loss
aversion. The law is much more concerned with preventing, and
compensating for, undeserved losses than with preventing, or
disgorging, undeserved gains. In the face of uncertainty, the law
ordinarily adheres to the status quo, thereby possibly depriving people
of deserved gains, yet avoiding the risk of inflicting undeserved losses.
Exposing the correlation between the law and the psychological
notion of loss aversion does not, in and of itself, explain or justify the
pertinent legal norms. This Part briefly alluded to possible
explanations and justifications, and the following Parts will explore
them in a systematic and detailed fashion.
III. EXPLAINING THE COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY
This Part proposes and assesses two possible explanations for
the compatibility between the fundamental characteristics of the law
described above and loss aversion. According to the first theory, the
aforementioned characteristics are the product of an evolutionary
process propelled primarily by plaintiffs' behavior. According to the
second and more powerful theory, the notions of reference points and
176. See, e.g., Scott Altman, Divorcing Threats and Offers, 15 LAw & PHIL. 209 (1996)
(analyzing possible baselines for determining whether an assertion that a person would be
deprived of some option, unless she agrees to something, constitutes a wrongful threat).
177. See, e.g., Thomas Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L
REV. 109, 110 (2001) (critically discussing the rule against the backdrop of differences of opinion
among federal courts in this regard); John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions,
91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 526, 528, 530, 534-35, 546 (1978) (describing the history of and criticizing
the rule of preserving the status quo in preliminary injunctions).
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loss aversion underlie commonsense morality, which in turn informs
the law.
A. Evolutionary Theories: Plaintiffs' Role
In most legal spheres, judges rarely base their decisions
explicitly on considerations of economic efficiency (and certainly have
not done so in the past). Yet, legal economists have long argued that,
by and large, the common law is efficient. 178 One of the most
intriguing explanations for this observation has been evolutionary. 179
Starting with the seminal articles of Paul Rubin and George Priest,180
an extensive body of literature has examined the hypothesis that even
if judges do not care about efficiency, a process in which inefficient
rules are gradually extinguished while efficient ones survive may
result from the self-serving behavior of litigants.181
All versions of this hypothesis have been sharply criticized to
the extent that some are skeptical of the entire endeavor.18 2 I
nevertheless believe that this body of literature contains valuable
178. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 763-
64 (1975) (arguing that legal doctrines have been strongly, though implicitly, "influenced by a
concern... with promoting economic efficiency" and that "the logic of law is really economics).
179. Other explanations rest on the typical convergence between the conclusions of efficiency
analyses and deontological notions of corrective justice and on the claim that while judges
employ the rhetoric of rights and corrective justice, they actually strive to enhance overall social
welfare (at least more so than legislators). On the former argument, see generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 1567 (2004)
("[D]eontologists and utilitarians typically agree about concrete cases .. )..'); Zamir, supra note
36, at 1754 (pointing to "the typical convergence of efficiency analysis and intuitive notions of
justice and fairness'). For the latter argument, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 399-418 (2d ed. 1977).
180. Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); George
L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65
(1977).
181. For a critical review of the early contributions to this literature, see E. Donald Elliott,
The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38, 62-71 (1985). For updated
surveys, see Francesco Parisi, The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis, in 2 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 195-98 (Charles K Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004);
Paul H. Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
19 (2005). For a collection of twenty-two major contributions to this literature, see THE
EVOLUTION OF EFFICENT COMMON LAW (Paul H. Rubin ed., 2007).
182. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, The Common Law as Central Economic Planning, 3 CONST.
POL. ECON. 289, 297 (1992) ("Combinations and permutations of assumptions within [the
evolutionary models of the common law] raise the possibility of millions of findings, only a few of
which have been explored. The models to date thus remain profoundly inconclusive and
incomplete... .'); Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1521 (2007) ("After some thirty years of discussion, the fairest
assessment is that the thesis of common law efficiency (at least as driven by demand-side effects)
should best be taken as a possibility, no more.").
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insights that may shed light on the compatibility between loss
aversion and basic features of the law. One such insight is that the
direction of the law's evolution is not only set by courts' reasoned
decisions; the behavior of the litigants is important as well. 8 3 Another
insight is that, even prior to the decision of whether to litigate or
settle a case, the existence of a dispute is a precondition for the
evolution of judge-made law, efficient or not.' s4 No judge-made rule
could evolve absent a legal dispute.
Since the basic features of the law I aim to explain via the
notions of reference points and loss aversion are rather general and
mostly characteristic of both modern and premodern systems, it seems
appropriate to initially focus on the formative periods of the law, when
litigants primarily cared about the resolution of specific disputes. The
growing impact of small, well-organized interest groups who are
repeat players in a certain sphere of activity and can strategically
orchestrate adjudication so as to produce favorable precedents is a
relatively recent phenomenon. 8 5 At any rate, I shall argue that the
presence of organized interest groups need not alter the conclusion.
The economic literature assumes that whenever there is a legal
dispute, the parties decide whether to litigate or settle out of court
according to the expected costs and benefits of each alternative. 86
This assumption does not distinguish between cases in which a
potential plaintiff seeks redress for a loss allegedly inflicted on her
and cases in which she seeks to attain a benefit she never had. There
183. According to Priest's original argument, inefficient rules generate more litigation The
more a rule is litigated, the greater the chances that it will be changed. Efficient rules survive
simply because they generate less litigation-and thus offer fewer opportunities to alter them.
Priest, supra note 180. In the same spirit, when a rule inefficiently allocates an entitlement to
someone who values it less than someone else, the latter is likely to exert more effort to
challenge the rule than the former is to defend it. Since litigants who expend more effort are
more likely to prevail, courts are more prone to overturning inefficient rules. John C. Goodman,
An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978).
184. See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects of Judicial Decisions, 79
GEO. LJ. 1447, 1492 (1991) ("[I]f the law places the incentive to avoid the situation leading to
the dispute on the party that can more cheaply avoid the situation, the situation will arise less
often.... [Tihe incentive-efficient rule would be in effect longer than the inefficient rule because
disputes would not arise as quickly.'). For a parallel hypothesis regarding the evolution of
protomorality and morality through third-party interference in conflicts among members of
cooperating groups of primates (yielding generalized moral, and eventually legal, norms), see
Christopher Boehm, The Evolutionary Development of Morality as an Effect of Dominance
Behavior and Conflict Interference, 5 J. Soc. & BIOL. STRUCTURES 413 (1982).
185. Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1982) (arguing
that the efficiency of the common law is primarily due to the fact that most common law rules
were developed through the early twentieth century when the costs of organizing interest groups
were high).
186. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 180 (discussing the parties' decisions to settle or litigate
under different circumstances).
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is presumably no difference between causes of action resting on civil
wrongs and those resting on unjust enrichment. Similarly, the
economic analysis does not distinguish between a case in which,
following a breach of contract, the nonbreaching party claims reliance
or expectation damages and a case in which she claims a disgorgement
relief. In these and comparable cases, the law may either recognize or
deny the plaintiff's legal entitlement, and, in all cases, current rules
may be either efficient or inefficient.
If, however, people perceive losses as much more painful than
unobtained gains, then potential plaintiffs would be much less
inclined to sue for unobtained gains than for losses. In the case of
unobtained gains, oftentimes people do not experience any disutility or
experience at most a negligible one. In such cases, no dispute would
arise. And even if some disutility is experienced for unobtained gains,
it is less likely to be large enough to induce people to sue for legal
relief or even threaten to do so. Filing a suit or threatening to file one
entails considerable costs: monetary, reputational, emotional, and so
forth.18 7 Since unobtained gains are less likely to produce disutility
large enough to justify legal action (or, in ancient societies, recourse to
informal dispute-resolution mechanisms), considerably fewer disputes
are expected to revolve around unobtained gains. As legal norms
develop out of disputes, it stands to reason that the law of unjust
enrichment, governmental givings, and disgorgement remedies would
be considerably less developed than the law of torts, governmental
takings, and reliance or expectation remedies.188 This would be the
case whether the resulting dissimilarities between the norms
governing each part of these pairs are efficient or inefficient, fair or
unfair. 189
187. See, e.g., Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 60-67 (1963) (documenting the strong inclination of businesspeople
to resolve disputes through nonlegal mechanisms and their reasons for avoiding the legal
system); Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE
L.J. 1643 (1985) (discussing the costs of litigation).
188. Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235, 259-84 (1979). Whereas the basic economic, evolutionary argument assumed that the
more a rule is litigated, the more it is likely to be changed, Landes and Posner cogently point out
that repeat litigation may actually strengthen existing precedents. Id.
189. Note that this hypothesis uses the notions of reference points and loss aversion to
explain how people's perceptions shape the law. In contrast, recent contributions to the
efficiency-of-the-common-law literature use comparable notions to explain the complementary
process by which the law shapes people's perceptions. See Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories
of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 425, 429-
30, 434 (2005) (arguing that due to the status quo bias, the law's effect on people's valuations of
entitlements may hinder the evolution of efficient rules); Robert L. Scharff & Francesco Parisi,
The Role of Status Quo Bias and Bayesian Learning in the Creation of New Legal Rights, 3 J.L.
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While this hypothesis focuses on judge-made law evolving as a
result of the behavior of plaintiffs who are single-shot players, it
basically holds true when we turn our attention to the "supply side" of
precedents, consider plaintiffs who are repeat players, and reflect on
statutory law. As for supply-side evolution, the efficiency-of-the-
common-law hypothesis posits that competition between courts has
been conducive to the emergence of efficient common law because
litigants preferred courts implementing efficient norms. 190 To the
extent that one accepts this argument, 191 once we add loss aversion to
the analysis, competition between courts is expected to yield
asymmetries of the sort that we discuss. A court devoting resources to
the development of legal entitlements that are not in much demand is
likely to fare worse than a court developing and implementing norms
that better match litigants' (and in particular, plaintiffs') concerns. If
loss-averse plaintiffs care much more about losses than unobtained
gains, responsive courts would produce a set of rules reflecting this
common perception.
Regarding litigants who are repeat players, several scholars
have argued that small, well-organized interest groups are likely to
fare better in courts than single-shot litigants, thus obstructing the
evolution of an efficient common law. 192 Inasmuch as repeat players
are rational maximizers, their presence may similarly weaken the
present hypothesis. However, while the experimental and empirical
data is not unequivocal, there is much support for the proposition that
loss aversion characterizes choices made by experienced
decisionmakers, including businesspeople.193 In fact, some studies
ECON. & POL'Y 25 (2006) (arguing that status quo bias may transform ex ante inefficient rules
into ex post efficient ones). I discuss these issues in Part IV.C.
190. Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side
Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003).
191. The weakness of the argument lies in the fact that competition between courts need not
necessarily lead to more efficient rules. Such competition allows plaintiffs to select courts that
tend to impose broader liability and award more generous relief whether the ensuing norms are
efficient or not. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A
Dynamic Model, 116 PUB. CHOICE 419 (2003) (discussing plaintiffs control and incentives in
bringing a case to court).
192. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 180, at 55-56; see also Aranson, supra note 182, at 297.
193. See, e.g., Joshua D. Coval & Tyler Shumway, Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices?, 60 J.
FIN. 1, 1 (2005) (finding that Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders display high loss
aversion, regularly assuming above-average afternoon risk to recover from morning losses); J.B.
McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 NEW ENGLAND J.
MED. 1259 (1982) (describing an experiment in which physicians' choices between alternative
medical treatments depended on the manner in which the data was presented to them:
probability of death or probability of survival); Robert A. Olsen, Prospect Theory as an
Explanation of Risky Choice by Professional Investors: Some Evidence, 6 REV. FIN. ECON. 225
(1997) (finding that the perceptions and preferences of professional investment managers
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indicate that professionals display greater loss aversion than
laypeople. 194 It follows that the activity of repeat players may indeed
affect judge-made law, yet it is unlikely to counteract the tendency to
provide considerably greater legal protection for losses than for
unobtained gains. Like anybody else, repeat players, too, are likely to
resent losses more than unobtained gains. Nevertheless, one should
concede that the greater the proportion of litigants who are not loss
averse, the less powerful the present theory is.
Similar arguments can be made regarding the supply and
demand (including demand by interest groups) of statutory and even
constitutional law. While legal economists are often suspicious of
legislators' motives and hence about the efficiency of statutory law,
they have long observed that the evolutionary model of the common
law is in principle applicable to the legislative process as well. 195 At
the same time, the distortions resulting from effective rent seeking by
well-organized interest groups are even more relevant to the
legislative arena. 96 However, as long as interest groups invest more
energy in the fight against initiatives that would deprive them of
entitlements they already have than in the campaign for new
comport with PT); Zur Shapira & Itzhak Venezia, Patterns of Behavior of Professionally
Managed and Independent Investors, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 1573, 1577 (2001) (similar findings).
For opposite findings, see, for example, John A. List, Neoclassical Theory vs. Prospect Theory:
Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615 (2004) (finding that people with intense
market experience behave largely in accordance with neoclassical economy predictions).
194. See, e.g., Sheharyar Bokhari & David Geltner, Loss Aversion and Anchoring in
Commercial Real Estate Pricing: Empirical Evidence and Price Index Implications, 39 REAL
ESTATE ECON. 635 (2011) (sophisticated, commercial investors); Michael S. Haigh & John A List,
Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis, 60 J. FIN. 523
(2005) (professional traders).
195. See, e.g., GORDON TuLLoCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE
198 (1980) ("[Jjnsofar as this model does indicate that judicial proceedings would tend toward
efficiency, it indicates that both legislative and executive rule making would have a much
stronger tendency."); Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation
Versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 47 (1982) ("[Tlhe thrust of this efficiency-
through-strength argument is by no means limited to the arena of common law litigation. With
minimal modifications the same logic can be applied also to the forces determining statue law...
."); Rubin, supra note 180, at 61 (applying the evolution-of-the-common-law analysis to statutory
law); Vermeule, supra note 182, at 1524-26 ("Over time, inefficient precedents will be challenged
more often and more frequently overturned. This model is, however, essentially the same as a
standard model suggesting that legislation will be efficient, and for the same reasons.').
196. TULLOCK, supra note 195, at 186-206 (comparing lawmaking by courts with other
sources of law); Rubin, supra note 180, at 61 (comparing the behavior of well-defined small
groups in the legislative arena to that of repeat players in litigation); Rubin, supra note 185
(arguing that the greater efficiency of the common law is primarily due to the fact that most
common law rules were developed when the costs of organizing interest groups were high); see
also Becker, supra note 87 (formulating a general theory of rent-seeking by pressure groups in
the political arena).
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entitlements (which is plausibly the case), the proposed theory holds
true.
The present theory is more modest than the efficiency-of-the-
common-law hypothesis, and hence expectantly less objectionable. The
efficiency-of-the-common-law hypothesis, like economic analysis of law
in general, is potentially relevant to every legal norm. Therefore, it
might be criticized on the grounds that it does not provide concrete,
testable predictions regarding specific rules and that in fact the
common law is sometimes inefficient. In contrast, I do not argue that
loss aversion explains the intricacies of any legal field. Rather, I offer
it as an explanation for general, basic features of the law.
The present suggestion is also more modest in the sense that it
is not offered as an exclusive or even the primary explanation for the
compatibility between loss aversion and the law. At the end of the day,
it is only meant as supplementary to the explanation that will be
discussed below. This caution is appropriate for several reasons. First,
the evolutionary theory explains why losers are more likely to file
suits than no-gainers. However, even if a loss is two, three, or four
times more painful than an unobtained gain, one should only expect
significant difference in the rate of lawsuits with regard to relatively
small gains. For instance, if losers typically file suits only for losses
exceeding $10,000, and if losses are three times more painful than
unobtained gains, then one would expect plaintiffs to file suits for
unobtained gains exceeding $30,000. Still, there should be many such
cases. Hence, while an evolutionary theory based on loss aversion may
explain why legal norms dealing with losses develop faster than norms
dealing with unobtained gains, it does not necessarily account for the
dramatic differences observed in Part II between governmental
takings and givings, tort and unjust enrichment, firing and not hiring,
and so forth. At the same time, if one takes the analogy between legal
and biological evolution seriously, and if the resources of litigants,
lobbyists, and legal policymakers are limited, then one would expect
that the greater resources devoted to developing doctrines protecting
people from losses would crowd out doctrines dealing with unobtained
gains. Another response is that, while norms dealing with losses are
more developed than those dealing with unattained gains, the latter
do exist.
Another reason for cautiousness pertains to the examples of
tort versus unjust enrichment and the expectation versus
disgorgement remedies for breach of contract. In these cases, the same
incident can involve both losses to one person and gains to another. In
such cases, while the losses to the plaintiff may induce her to file a
suit, once she takes legal action there is no apparent reason for her to
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content herself with claiming her losses if the defendant's gains are
larger than these losses. 197 In response, I note that these cases
represent only a small fraction of the cases discussed in Part II.
Moreover, it stands to reason that at least some plaintiffs fail to base
their claims on defendants' gains because they do not view these gains
as something to which they are entitled.
Finally, the evolutionary theory may be criticized on the
grounds that, from the plaintiffs perspective, legal relief may always
be perceived as belonging in the domain of gains. 198 This difficulty
does not apply to the commonsense morality explanation discussed
below, as the latter focuses on the standpoint of the impartial
policymaker, who is more likely to view the entire course of events and
do so from an ex ante perspective. Like the previous critiques of the
evolutionary hypothesis, however, this critique is not fatal, as it
remains true that people who incurred a loss are more strongly
motivated to seek legal redress than people who failed to obtain a
gain. Yet, it does somewhat weaken the evolutionary theory. The next
Section thus turns to what seems to be a more powerful explanation,
focusing on the mindset of legal policymakers.
B. Cognitive Psychology, Commonsense Morality, and the Law
While the evolutionary hypothesis discussed above is plausible,
a more robust explanation for the compatibility between the
psychological notion of loss aversion and the law seems to rest on an
intermediate factor: commonsense morality. This explanation posits
that, by and large, the law conforms to prevailing moral intuitions,
and since the latter are closely linked to notions of reference points
and loss aversion, these notions shape the law as well.
Commonsense morality is deontological. People believe that
enhancing good outcomes is desirable, yet they also hold that
attaining this goal is subject to moral constraints. These constraints
include prohibitions against lying, against breaking promises, and
most importantly, against intentionally or actively harming other
people. Because such acts are inherently wrong, they are
impermissible even as a means to furthering overall good. It is
immoral to kill one person and harvest her organs to save the lives of
three other people. It is similarly immoral to torture the baby
daughter of a terrorist to force him to reveal information that would
197. See also supra notes 56, 71, 132 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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save some lives. 199 At the same time, commonsense morality
recognizes options: under many circumstances, an agent may
legitimately prefer her own interests and the interests of her beloveds
or members of her community over the enhancement of the overall
good.200 Commonsense morality largely comports with moderate,
rather than absolutist, deontology. It accepts that constraints and
options have thresholds. When enough good (or, much more
commonly, bad) is at stake, one may justifiably infringe a constraint
(or have no option not to maximize the good).20 1
Deontology does not primarily judge the morality of an action
(or anything else) according to its outcomes but rather focuses on the
morality of the action itself.202 The fact that a person is tortured is a
bad thing; and if two people are tortured, it is certainly worse.
However, for the deontologist, the fact that she tortures one person
may well be worse than the fact that, somewhere in the world, two
people are being tortured by someone else. Being deontological,
commonsense morality is distinctively agent-relative (rather than
agent-neutral) .203
Deontological morality distinguishes between harming a
person and not benefiting her. While this distinction--often phrased
in terms of avoiding pain versus promoting happiness-may be
endorsed by consequentialists, 2 4  it is primarily embedded in
deontological and commonsense morality. Were promotion of the good
as compelling as eliminating the bad, the doing/allowing distinction,
which is essential for the deontological moral constraint against
199. On the basic tenets of deontological morality see generally SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE
ETHICS 70-78 (1998); ZAMIR &MEDINA, supra note 106, at 41-42.
200. See generally KAGAN, supra note 199, at 161-70.
201. Id. at 78-84 (discussing thresholds); ZAMIR & MEDINA, supra note 106, at 46-47. On the
compatibility between commonsense morality and moderate deontology, see, for example,
Samantha Brennan, Thresholds for Rights, 33 S.J. PHIL. 143, 145 (1995) ('The view that (many if
not all) rights have thresholds is .. . an extremely common one, both among the general public
and among philosophers engaged in moral theory."); Samuel Scheffler, Introduction, in
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 9 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988) ('Indeed, most would agree
that [deontological constraints and options] mirror everyday moral thought much more closely
than consequentialism does."). Even critics of threshold deontology readily admit that it
comports with commonsense morality much better than rival theories. SHELLY KAGAN, THE
LIMITS OF MORALITY 1-5 (1989).
202. Stephen Darwall, Introduction, in DEONTOIDGY 1 (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003).
203. ZAMIR & MEDINA, supra note 106, at 41-42; see also STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-
PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 37 (2006) (noting that agent
relativity is part of moral common sense).
204. James Griffin, Is Unhappiness Morally More Important than Happiness?, 29 PHIL. Q.
47, 47 (1979). In fact, this judgment is often labeled "negative utilitarianism." See, e.g., R.N.




harming people, would have collapsed. According to this distinction,
whereas it is forbidden to actively inflict pain or loss on people, there
is no constraint-or more precisely, a considerably less stringent
constraint-against allowing people to suffer an injury or a loss. 20 5
The prohibition against killing one person in order to harvest her
organs to save the lives of three other people necessarily implies that
actively killing an involuntary "donor" is worse than allowing the
death of three other people. Otherwise, there would be a prohibition
against both killing the one and not killing her (thereby allowing the
death of the three). Now, whenever an agent abides by the prohibition
against actively doing harm (e.g., refrains from killing one person),
she simultaneously avoids doing harm to the one and avoids doing
good to the three. The doing/allowing distinction, which is essential to
deontological constraints and commonsense morality, thus inevitably
entails a doing good/doing bad distinction. Promoting the good is less
morally compelling than eliminating the bad. 206
The same argument holds true if instead of the doing/allowing
distinction, one adopts the intending/foreseeing distinction. Take, for
example, the famous "trolley problem." An uncontrolled trolley is
hurtling down a track. Directly in its path stand five people who
cannot escape and will be killed by the runaway trolley. An agent can
flip a switch, diverting the trolley to another track where it will kill a
single individual. Should the agent flip the switch? Alternatively,
suppose that the only way that the agent can save the five people is by
causing another individual to fall onto the track, thereby blocking the
trolley while killing that individual. Should the agent cause the other
individual's fall? Most people find diverting the trolley morally
permitted, perhaps even required, but they find using another person
to block the trolley morally forbidden. Deontologists ground the
difference in the distinction between killing as a mere side effect in the
diverting scenario-that is, foreseeing harm-and killing as a means
205. See KILUNG AND LETING DIE (Bonnie Steinbock & Alastair Norcross eds., 2d ed. 1994)
(a collection of studies of the doing/allowing distinction); KAGAN, supra note 199, at 94-100 (a
critical overview of "doing" versus "allowing"); KAGAN, supra note 201, at 83-127 (a critique). For
psychological studies substantiating the prevalence of this intuition, see, for example, Ilana
Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 263 (1990) [hereinafter Ritov & Baron, Reluctance]; Jonathan Baron & Ilana
Ritov, Reference Points and Omission Bias, 59 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 475 (1994) [hereinafter Baron & Ritov, Reference Points].
206. On this distinction, see KAGAN, supra note 201, at 121-25 (a critique); F.M Kamm,
Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status, 21 PHIL &
PUB. AFF. 354, 381-82 (1992) (a reply to the critique); see also N. Ann Davis, The Priority of
Avoiding Harm, in KILLING AND LE'iTING DIE, supra note 205, at 298 (criticizing the
deontological distinctions).
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in the blocking scenario-that is, intending harm.20 7 Now, if it is
forbidden to use a person to block the trolley, this necessarily implies
that intending good (saving the five) is less compelling than not
intending bad (killing the one as a means). The intending/foreseeing
distinction hence entails a distinction between intending good and
intending bad.20
The distinction between promoting the good and eliminating
the bad is also part of the prevailing moral belief about options. While
people are expected to make occasional sacrifices in order to eliminate
the bad, such as providing bare necessities to the underprivileged,
they are not required to make sacrifices to promote the good, such as
further enhancing the welfare of the privileged, even if doing so would
increase aggregate welfare.
The judgment that preventing the bad is more compelling than
promoting the good is subject to serious philosophical objections. 209 It
nevertheless reflects widely held moral intuitions.210
The moral distinction between promoting the good and
eliminating the bad straightforwardly corresponds with the
psychological notions of reference points and loss aversion. Losses,
unhappiness, disutility, and harm loom larger than gains, happiness,
utility, and benefit. Parenthetically, one may also observe a
correspondence between the deontological doing/allowing distinction
(which is closely connected to the doing good/doing bad distinction)
and the psychological omission bias (closely connected to status quo
bias and loss aversion).211 Indeed, most of the psychological studies
207. On the trolley problem, see generally PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the
Doctrine of the Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
19, 23 (1978); F.M. Kamm, Harming Some to Save Others, 57 PHIL. STUD. 227 (1989); Alison
McIntyre, Doing Away with Double Effect, 111 ETHICS 219 (2001); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The
Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985).
208. For the claim that deontology must resort to the doing/allowing, intending/foreseeing, or
some such distinction (which in turn, as demonstrated, entails a distinction between
doing/intending good and doing/intending bad), see David Enoch, Intending, Foreseeing, and the
State, 13 LEGAL THEORY 69, 97-99 (2007).
209. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 204 (critically discussing different versions of affording
greater moral weight to unhappiness than to happiness and concluding that none of them is
plausible); R.I. Sikora, Negative Utilitarianism: Not Dead Yet, 85 MIND 587 (1976) (criticizing the
modest version of negative utilitarianism proposed by Walker, supra note 204); Smart, supra
note 204 (arguing that negative utilitarianism allows for absurd and even wicked moral
judgments).
210. For psychological evidence of this intuition, see, for example, Jonathan Baron & Mark
Spranca, Protected Values, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 10-11
(1997) (finding that people are much more supportive of medical intervention aimed at
increasing newborns' IQs from subnormal to normal than from normal to superior).
211. On the linkage between omission bias and loss aversion, see Maya Bar-Hillel & Efrat
Neter, Why Are People Reluctant to Exchange Lottery Tickets?, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
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focus on people's perceptions and choices regarding gains and losses to
themselves, whereas morality centers on the effects of one's conduct
on other people. However, it has been established that loss aversion
characterizes not only people's perceptions and choices regarding their
own health, wealth, or welfare, but also regarding the effects of one's
decisions and behavior on the health, wealth, or welfare of others. 212
Therefore, even if one sets aside the evolutionary explanations based
on plaintiffs' behavior discussed in Part III.A, the prevailing moral
intuitions of legal policymakers-legislators, judges, and
administrators-may explain the manifest correlation between
psychology and law described in Part II.
In addition to the close correspondence between psychology and
morality, this thesis assumes a correlation between morality and law.
It should be noted that such a correlation does not assume any
particular philosophical theory of law. It is of course compatible with
natural law theories holding that law is intimately connected with
morality and that an immoral law is not valid.213 Yet, it is also
compatible with legal positivism. While rejecting the notion that the
validity of law depends on its merits, 214 legal positivists do not deny
the connection between law and morality. For instance, H.L.A. Hart
readily concedes that "[t]he law of every modern state shows at a
PSYCHOL 17, 25 (1996) (concluding that people's reluctance to exchange lottery tickets rests on
loss aversion: "[T] he state of the world in which one's original ticket wins (or ... could have won)
but the new one does not, represents a 'loss,' whereas the state of the world in which the new
ticket, had one exchanged for it, would have won, but holding onto one's original ticket results in
no win, is merely a foregone gain.'); supra note 34 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Baron & Ritov, Reference Points, supra note 205, at 483-89 (describing an
experiment in which respondents were asked to imagine themselves as government officials
facing a decision whether to change a policy that is expected to affect the unemployment rate);
Moshinsky & Bar-Hillel, supra note 20 (studying policy choices); Ritov & Baron, Reluctance,
supra note 205 (describing experiments in which participants were asked whether they would
support a law mandating the vaccination of all children where the vaccination would eliminate
the risk of death from flu but may have fatal side effects); Vars, supra note 119 (studying
people's attitudes to affirmative-action plans that involve either not giving or taking from
others). While the studies of Baron and Ritov focused on the omission bias, as the second study
has established, this bias is closely connected to loss aversion. Thus, a vaccination entails both
active provision of a gain (eliminating the risk of death from the flu) and active infliction of a loss
(exposing to the risk of death from the vaccine). A choice not to vaccinate when the magnitude of
the latter risk is about half the size of the former implies that losses loom larger than gains. See
also supra note 211 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., David 0. Brink, Legal Positivism and Natural Law Reconsidered, 68 MONIST
364, 365 (1985) ("[Natural law theory of legal validity] claims that morality is a necessary and
perhaps also a sufficient condition of legality.").
214. Id. at 365 ("[Legal positivism theory of legal validity] denies that morality is either a
necessary or a sufficient condition of legality."); John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5% Myths, 46
AM. J. JURIS. 199, 199 (2001) (defining the core of legal positivism as the claim that "[i]n any
legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of
that system, depends on its sources, not its merits").
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thousand points the influence of both the accepted social morality and
wider moral ideals. These influences enter into law either abruptly
and avowedly through legislation, or silently and piecemeal through
the judicial process. 215 Hart further states that "[n]o 'positivist' could
deny.., that the stability of legal systems depends in part upon
[certain] types of correspondence with morals."216
Indeed, one can hardly deny that legal norms very often are
commensurate with moderate deontology and commonsense morality.
One example is the compatibility between the doing/allowing and
intending/foreseeing distinctions and various aspects of criminal
liability. 21 7 In contract law, the limits on precontractual disclosure
duties (even when broader duties would likely promote the overall
good) are best understood as embodying deontological options.218
Likewise, the radically different legal treatment of liquidated damages
for delay versus bonuses for earlier completion (where the agreed-
upon completion date serves as a reference point) clearly rests on the
deontological duty to keep one's promise.219 Finally, the discussion in
Part II referred to several basic features of the law that correspond to
the distinction between doing bad (inflicting a loss) and doing good
(conferring a gain), which the deontological doing/allowing and
intending/foreseeing distinctions presuppose.
The proposed correspondence between psychology, morality,
and law falls into line with recent theories of evolutionary psychology,
evolutionary morality, and moral psychology. At the risk of
oversimplification, these intriguing theories posit that human
morality is largely innate-the outcome of a long process of
evolutionary adaptation.220 Just as the human brain is genetically
215. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 203-04 (2d ed. 1994).
216. Id. at 204; see also Gardner, supra note 214, at 222-23 (describing the legal positivism
thesis that "there is no necessary connection between law and morality" as "absurd" and as one
that "no legal philosopher of note has ever endorsed'); Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the
Separation of Law and Morals, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105, 107
(Robert P. George ed., 1992) (rejecting the notion that "positivists are amoralists, or unconcerned
about the moral quality of the positive law").
217. See Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR L. REV. 280, 299-314
(1989) (describing seven deontological distinctions and their correspondence with three aspects of
legal culpability).
218. ZAMIR& MEDINA, supra note 106, at 289-91.
219. Id. at 301-03.
220. There is an abundant literature on evolutionary and moral psychology. For general
overviews and useful collections of essays, see RICHARD JOYCE, THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY
(2006); ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS (Paul Thompson ed., 1995); 1 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008)
[hereinafter MORAL PSYCHOL.]; William FitzPatrick, Morality and Evolutionary Biology, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2008), available at httpJ/plato.stanford.edu/
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equipped with a specific ability to acquire language (the Chomskyan
theory of "universal grammar"), 221 it is genetically equipped with a
kind of "moral grammar." This innate moral grammar structures
people's moral judgments, thereby indirectly informing the law.
Proponents of these theories neither dispute the considerable
divergence of moral norms in different societies nor deny the
significant role that social environment plays in inculcating particular
moral norms. Even if all people share the same innate psychological
mechanisms, these mechanisms may generate diverse moral norms
under different environments (just as languages vastly differ from one
another).222 Yet, they argue that some basic structural features of
morality are universal. Among these very basic, universal
characteristics, one finds deontological agent-relativity. 223 Arguably,
the fact that commonsense morality is deontological is no coincidence;
it is an innate and universal characteristic of the human species.
In addition to the relevance of these theories to biology,
psychology, anthropology, and moral philosophy, they may contribute
to legal theory.224 Some scholars argue that evolutionary analyses may
not only improve our understanding of legal norms but even inform
archives/win2008/entries/morality-biology; John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological
Foundations of Culture, in THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
GENERATION OF CULTURE 19 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992).
221. For an overview and references, see, for example, VIVIAN COOK & MARK NEWSON,
CHOMSKY'S UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1996); S. Cristofaro, Linguistic
Universals, Chomskyan, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS 222-24 (2d ed.
2006).
222. JOYCE, supra note 220, at 5 (explaining that evolutionary psychology does not "imply
that an adaptation must result in cross-cultural universals in human behavior," as "[t]he evolved
mechanisms may be designed to be environmentally sensitive, may operate unexpectedly in
unanticipated environments, or may not develop at all if not properly triggered"); Robin Bradley
Kar, The Deep Structure of Law and Morality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 877, 893 (2006) (maintaining that
the deep structure of moral psychology is "perfectly consistent with the broadest range of moral
and legal views").
223. MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: HOW NATURE DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL SENSE OF
RIGHT AND WRONG 111-31 (2006) (describing large-scale experiments attesting to remarkable
uniformity in people's reactions to various versions of the trolley problem and comparable moral
dilemmas, along with people's difficulty to explain their intuitive judgments); JOHN MIKHAIIL
ELEMENTS OF MORAL COGNITION (2011) (proposing a general theory of innate, universal moral
grammar); Kar, supra note 222, at 902, 924-31.
224. See generally Kar, supra note 222 (arguing that law and morality share a deep and
pervasive structure, arising from the fact that both engage psychological adaptations that
facilitate the solving of various social contract problems). For the stronger and more problematic
claim that, just as there is an innate linguistic and moral grammar, there is also a universal
legal grammar or a "law instinct," see Michael D. Guttentag, Is There a Law Instinct?, 87 WASH.
U. L. REV. 269 (2009). For the radical and questionable claim that "a universal system of basic
rights is hardwired into our brains" and that this system includes property rights, a right to
basic fairness, liberty rights, and a right to be treated equally, see Edwin Fruehwald, A
Biological Basis of Rights, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 195, 212-28 (2010).
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legal policymaking. Since law strives to affect human behavior, it
must understand what causes this behavior, including its biological
and evolutionary sources. For instance, it has been suggested that
evolutionary analysis provides insight into such phenomena as
infanticide by stepfathers, and more broadly, sheds light on the role of
emotions and various heuristics in human decisionmaking. 225
Complementarily, it is argued that the core concepts of universal legal
fields as criminal law, torts, and contracts can inform moral
psychology. 226
The tenets of evolutionary psychology in general and its
relevance to legal policymaking in particular have been subject to
powerful critique. No one denies that people are born with a capacity
to learn and internalize moral norms. However, some contend that
this capacity is part of our general-purpose learning system, or at
least that nothing in the current scientific evidence compellingly
proves otherwise.227  Thus, universal moral grammar is as
controversial as Chomsky's linguistic theory.228 With regard to legal
regulation, it is conceded that, in principle, understanding the
biological etiology of human behavior can contribute to legal
regulation. First, such etiology is important if there is a correlation
between the innateness of a certain trait and its being unsusceptible
225. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 432-54; see also Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted
Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1190-96 (2001) (arguing that the more adaptive the predisposition
contributing to a certain behavior has been in the evolutionary process, the more difficult it
would be to alter it through legal incentives).
226. John Mikhail, Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of
Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledge, 50 PSYCHOL. LEARNING & MOTIVATION 27, 30 (2009)
(arguing that "untutored adults and even young children are intuitive lawyers, who are capable
of drawing intelligent distinctions between superficially similar cases," hence "future research in
moral psychology should" move beyond "pedagogically useful examples such as the trolley
problem and other cases of necessity to the core concepts of universal fields like tort, contracts,
criminal law, property, agency, equity, procedure and unjust enrichment ..."); see also John
Mikhail, Is the Prohibition of Homicide Universal?: Evidence from Comparative Criminal Law,
75 BROOK L. REV. 497 (2009) (exposing uniform features of the crime of homicide).
227. Jesse J. Prinz, Is Morality Innate?, in MORAL PSYCHOL, supra note 220, at 367; see also
Elisabeth A. Lloyd & Marcus W. Feldman, Evolutionary Psychology: A View From Evolutionary
Biology, 13 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 150 (2002) (arguing that the reduced version of evolutionary
biology incorporated into much of evolutionary psychology leads to faulty science). But see Bruce
J. Ellis & Timothy Ketelaar, Clarifying the Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology: A Reply to
Lloyd and Feldman, 13 PSYCHOL INQUIRY 157 (2002) (replying to the critique).
228. See, e.g., GEOFFREY SAMPSON, THE "LANGUAGE INSTINCT" DEBATE (rev. ed. 2005)
(critically discussing and ultimately rejecting the idea that human beings have an innate
"language instinct'). Note that Chomsky revised his theory more than once and that the latest
version-known as the Minimalist Program-actually does away with the notion of deep
structure. See NOAM CHOMSKY, THE MINIMALIST PROGRAM (1995); H. Lasnik, Minimalism, in 6
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS, supra note 221, at 149-56.
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to modification by legal incentives and disincentives. Second, it is
useful if it can assist the law in identifying legally relevant
pathological behaviors. Alas, critics claim, there is no necessary
correlation between the innateness of any behavior and its plasticity,
and the examples provided thus far for using the insights of
evolutionary psychology to identify nonplastic, pathological behaviors
are questionable. 229
To the extent that it can be established that loss aversion is a
universal characteristic of human psychology and that the basic
features of the law described in Part II universally characterize all
legal systems (or at least those systems that are sufficiently advanced
to deal with the pertinent issues), these universalities lend support to
theories of moral psychology. 230 Since the psychological findings
described in Part I corroborate the first assertion and the analysis of
legal norms in Part II confirms the second, my analysis indeed lends
support to at least some versions of moral psychology. There may also
be an evolutionary explanation for why the relative, quantitative
psychological distinction between losses and gains (losses loom larger
than gains, but gains do count) is translated into a sharper and more
qualitative (though not absolute) moral and legal distinction between
harming people and not aiding them. Given people's imperfect
cognitive abilities, a general prohibition on intentionally/actively
harming other people may be more adaptive than a more nuanced
norm.
It should be stressed, however, that neither the general
argument of this Article nor the claims made in this Section hinge on
the tenets of moral psychology. Viewing commonsense morality as the
connecting link between psychology and law does not presuppose the
innateness of prevailing moral intuitions, nor does it rest on their
universality. Even if the pertinent moral intuitions are not universal
but rather characteristic of modern, western legal systems, and even if
they are not innate but rather the outcome of learning and
socialization, it remains true that these intuitions are very common.
Thus, they can provide the link between loss aversion and the law.
229. Brian Leiter & Michael Weisberg, Why Evolutionary Biology Is (S9 Far) Irrelevant to
Legal Regulation, 29 LAW & PHIL. 31, 38-49 (2010).
230. Cf. JOYCE, supra note 220, at 5 (stating that although evolutionary psychology does not
necessitate cross-cultural universals, "cross-culturality can be offered as evidence of innateness
in the absence of any better hypothesis indicating a universally present exogenous explanans").
But see Prinz, supra note 227, at 372 ("Humans the world over face many of the same challenges,
and they have the same cognitive resources. If these two are put together, the same solutions to
challenges will often arise.").
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To sum up this Part, the correlation between the psychological
phenomena of reference dependence and loss aversion, and basic
characteristics of the law such as the tort/unjust enrichment and the
takings/givings asymmetries, are not coincidental. This correlation
may be the product of an evolution of judicial and statutory law given
plaintiffs' stronger motivation to seek redress for losses than for
unobtained gains. Primarily, though, it reflects the mindset of legal
policymakers, whose moral intuitions conform to commonsense
morality. Commonsense morality treats harms and benefits very
differently. Just as, psychologically, losses loom larger than gains,
normatively, harms loom larger than benefits.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A. Positive and Normative Analyses
Thus far, the focus of the discussion has been explanatory. Yet,
the positive analysis of the fundamental role that reference points and
loss aversion play in the law also carries important normative
implications. This is not to say that one can directly derive "ought"
from "is." Rather, the claim is that theories of human psychology and
its interaction with the law may contribute to normative deliberation
in at least two ways. First, human psychology is relevant for the
construction of a normative theory. Basic elements of any normative
theory, including its underlying theory of human well-being and its
focal point (such as acts or rules), are founded on assumptions about
human psychology. 231 Second, and more importantly in the present
context, once a normative theory is formulated, legal policymakers
aiming at a certain goal, such as the promotion of economic equality or
deterrence of antisocial behavior, face pragmatic choices among
different means to achieving that goal. Positive theories of human
psychology and their reflection in the law may prove essential in
making these choices. 232
231. For instance, if people's actual preferences are often irrational and self-injurious, then
satisfying those preferences seems a poor measure of well-being. In the same vein, a major
argument favoring rule- (rather than act-) consequentialism is people's inability to accurately
conduct a cost-benefit analysis in each and every case. Different theories of human welfare will
be discussed in the next Section. For an analysis of possible focal points, see KAGAN, supra note
199, at 204-39.
232. See Adrian Vermeule, Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory, 10 U. PA. J.
CONST. L 387, 390-91 (2008) (discussing the role of factual inquires in prescriptive theories).
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This Part examines various normative implications of loss
aversion and its legal corollaries. It begins by justifying (rather than
merely explaining) the features of the law discussed in Part II. It then
explores the implications of the fact that legal norms sometimes
frame, rather than just mirror, people's choices. Finally, it considers
what follows from the fact that the decisions of policymakers are often
reference dependent.
B. Justifying Basic Features of Extant Law
The first normative implication directly refers to the basic
characteristics of the law discussed in Part II. The central role that
reference points and loss aversion play in people's perceptions and
behavior not only explains those basic characteristics, but it may
justify them as well.
All normative theories take outcomes into account, whether as
the only factor that ultimately determines the morality of an act, rule,
or anything else (consequentialism) or as one of several such factors
(deontology).233 The one type of outcome all theories deem relevant-
either as the only relevant outcome (in welfarist theories) or as one of
several types of pertinent outcomes (in other theories)-is the effect of
any act, rule, or anything else on human welfare. 234 Theories of
human welfare may be grouped under three large categories:
hedonistic, preference-based, and objective list. According to
hedonistic or mental-state theories, human well-being is determined
by the presence of positive mental states, such as pleasure, and the
absence of negative ones, such as pain. Under preference-satisfaction
theories, well-being is enhanced to the extent that one's desires are
fulfilled. The pertinent desires are those a person actually has (actual-
preference theories), or those she would have had were she to calmly
and rationally consider the issue, paying heed to all of the relevant
information and without any external pressure, prejudice, or
reasoning errors (ideal-preference theories). Finally, objective-list
theories posit that well-being consists of having certain things, such as
health, autonomy, and accomplishment, which are intrinsically
good. 235
233. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 26 (rev. ed. 1999) C'[D]eontological theories
are defined as non-teleological ones, not as views that characterize the rightness of institutions
and acts independently from their consequences. All ethical doctrines worth our attention take
consequences into account in judging rightness.').
234. KAGAN, supra note 199, at 30.
235. For general surveys of competing theories of well-being, see id. at 25-41; DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS 493-502 (1984).
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Whichever theory of human welfare one adopts, reference
points and loss aversion must be taken into account. This is patently
the case under subjectivist-hedonistic and actual-preference-
theories. If a loss generates greater displeasure than an unobtained
gain and if people commonly prefer not losing to gaining, then any
policy striving to enhance human well-being should take these
phenomena into account. Arguably, this is exactly what the law does
when it lays down different rules for hiring and firing in affirmative-
action programs, places the burden of proof in civil litigation on the
plaintiff, treats governmental takings differently from governmental
givings, and so on and so forth.
The same is true Under objective-list theories of human well-
being. These theories do not view people's feelings or the satisfaction
of actual desires as the ultimate yardsticks of welfare. However, any
plausible list of objective goods includes enjoyment (experiencing
pleasure and avoiding pain) and personal freedom (the ability to set
one's goals and fulfill one's desires) as important features of well-
being.236 Hence, although objective-list theories may assign lesser
weight to loss aversion (compared to mental state and preference-
satisfaction theories), they too ought to take this phenomenon into
account. This should particularly be the case if, as argued above, loss
aversion is closely connected to emotions of pleasure and pain.237
The same argument seems to hold for ideal-preference theories
of well-being. Just as experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain are
elements of any plausible objective list, they are also things that
people ideally desire. If losses loom larger than gains, then this factor
ought to be taken into account by ideal-preference theories as well.
The last claim (as well as, to some extent, the one referring to
objective-list theories) may be contested on the grounds that reference
dependence and loss aversion are nothing but irrational biases. Thus,
even if they typify people's actual perceptions and preferences, an
ideal-preference theory should disregard them. This counterargument
assumes that ideal preferences are rational, and it presupposes a
particular notion of rationality, namely, expected utility
maximization. That argument is, however, problematic. Nothing in
expected utility theory necessitates a reference-independent utility
function. Just as a utility function may reflect risk aversion, risk
236. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property
Law, 78 N.Y.U. L REV. 1669, 1703-05 (2003).
237. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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neutrality, or risk seeking, 238  it may reflect either reference
independence or reference dependence. To be sure, some related
aspects of decisionmaking, such as its susceptibility to framing effects
and people's forecasting errors,239 as well as an extreme, paralyzing
aversion to losses, may indeed be deemed irrational. But as dozens of
studies have shown, errors of all sorts characterize decisionmaking
independent of whether one's utility function is reference dependent.
Reference dependence and loss aversion are not irrational per se. If
reference effects shape the experienced value of outcomes, then it is
perfectly rational to take these effects into account.240 Money and
other resources are instrumental for attaining intrinsic goods. If the
carriers of utility are not final levels of wealth, but rather gains and
losses, then ideal-preference theories should not disregard loss
aversion.
Three final comments are in order. First, even if there is
nothing objectionable in reference dependence per se, some framings
of baselines may be contestable and need not be taken as given. 241
Similarly, ideal-preference theories may disregard or afford lesser
weight to unreasonably extreme loss aversion. Second, since both
consequentialist and deontological moral theories recognize the worth
of promoting human welfare, the above analysis holds for both. Third,
while the above discussion used loss aversion to justify extant legal
norms, it may similarly be used to critically assess existing norms and
may help shape new ones. For example, loss aversion may justify
deferring the application of new laws that detract from current
238. LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 103-04 (2d. ed. 1972) ("TL'he law
of marginal utility plays no fundamental role in the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of utility,
viewed either empirically or normatively.').
239. See supra notes 20-24 and 39, and accompanying text.
240. Gregory W. Fischer et al., Risk Preferences for Gains and Losses in Multiple Objective
Decision Making, 32 MGMT. So. 1065, 1082-83 (1986); see also ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, LECTURE
NOTES IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 107-11 (2006) (arguing that "the doctrine of
consequentialism" (namely defining preferences over "final wealth levels') "is not part of
expected utility theory." Rather, "the set of prizes should be the set of consequences in the mind
of the decision maker. Thus it is equally reasonable to assume the consequences are 'wealth
changes' or 'final wealth levels.' '); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 220 (2006) ("[T]he endowment effect generally cannot be said to be a
mistake in the sense of.. . judgment errors ... where individuals are making objective mistakes
in estimating probabilities; instead the endowment effect may be a reflection of potentially valid
reasons for the difference between willingness to accept and willingness to pay."); infra notes
257-58 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 256-265 and accompanying text.
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entitlements so that they will only apply to people who have not yet
acquired the entitlement. 242
C. Law's Determination of Reference Points
Experimental studies have established that the perceived
reference point-determining what changes are considered as gains or
losses-is sometimes unfixed and even manipulable. 243 Specifically, it
has been demonstrated that legal norms may set the pertinent
baseline for people who are subject to those norms, thereby affecting
their behavior. 244 This finding may carry several implications.
First, it may seem to diminish the import of the Article's
explanatory and justificatory project. If the law can effortlessly and
effectively shape people's reference points, then preexisting baselines
could just as well be ignored. This argument, however, proves too
much. While people's framing is sometimes malleable, the ability of
the law to frame people's perceptions varies from one context to
another and is often limited. A pertinent example is tax deductions
and credits. Following a powerful campaign pointing to the various
pitfalls of using these measures, the federal government and most
states have adopted "tax expenditures budgets" which identify and
quantify tax subsidies, credits, and deductions as expenditures. 245 It
was expected that once the true nature and problematic ramifications
of tax subsidies became apparent, legislators would refrain from
channeling expenditures through the tax system. This assumption
was mostly proven wrong, as the use of tax expenditures has not been
reduced.246 Apparently, legislators and the public at large keep
framing tax credits and deductions differently from direct spending. 247
242. Cf. Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin, Promoting Consensus in Society Through Deferred-
Implementation Agreements, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 151 passim (2006) (discussing other advantages
of deferred implementation).
243. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Alberto Abadie & Sebastien Gay, The Impact of Presumed Consent Legislation
on Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross-Country Study, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 599 (2006) (finding
that presumed consent legislation has a positive and sizable effect on organ donation rates);
Korobkin, supra note 36, at 675-76 (establishing the effect of contract default rules on
bargaining); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1559-77 (1998) (presenting evidence that legal rights protected by
damages do not produce the same endowment effect as rights protected by injunctive relief).
245. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 163, at 1-30, 238-39; Zelinsky, supra note 162, at 803.
246. Kleinbard, supra note 163 (analyzing the failure of current tax expenditure budgets and
recent reform proposals); Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget,
54 HASTINGS LJ. 603, 623 (2003) ("[The introduction of tax expenditure budget did not
markedly succeed in lowering the growth of tax expenditures."); Victor Thuronyi, Tax
Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1170-81; id. at 1171 ("Congress has made
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The same is true of takings versus givings. It may be argued
that no property in land or development rights exist as long as the law
does not recognize and protects them. 248 A possible inference from this
argument is that all physical and regulatory takings and givings
belong in the realm of gains. Nevertheless, it is exceedingly unlikely
that the law could ever make landowners, whose land is appropriated
for public use or whose existing use of the land is curtailed, view these
changes as belonging in the domain of forgone gains. Perceived
reference points are determined by a confluence of psychological,
historical, social, and legal factors. It would be a mistake to overstate
the role of the last factor.249
A second, more compelling claim rooted in the impact of legal
norms on perceived reference points is a prima facie argument for
legal conservatism. 25° Typically, a change in legal norms yields gains
for some and losses to others. Loss aversion entails that the negative
impact of a certain decrease of the losers' entitlements is likely to be
greater than the positive impact of a comparable increase in the
gainers' entitlements. This consideration does not necessarily block
legal reforms; yet, it calls for caution. Ceteris paribus, a legal reform
should only be pursued if the gains from changing existing norms
outweigh its costs, where gains and losses are weighted differently as
the latter loom larger than the former.
Being cautious in rulemaking is appropriate for another
reason. Sometimes, advocates of a legal reform argue that if the
reform proves to be unsuccessful or harmful, it can be undone and the
preexisting legal order restored. This argument, however,
underestimates the framing effect of the new legal regime once
implemented. Loss aversion, the endowment effect, and the status quo
little progress in replacing tax expenditures with direct spending programs."); Zelinsky, supra
note 162, at 801-04 (making the same observation).
247. Thuronyi, supra note 246, at 1172 ("[E]vidence also indicates that Congress has not
taken the tax expenditure concept fully to heart. Many Members of Congress (as well as
Presidents Reagan and Bush) apparently regard tax expenditure repeal not as a decrease in
spending, but as an increase in taxes.'); Zelinsky, supra note 162, at 826.
248. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 308 (1843) (arguing that "there is no natural property. .. property is entirely the
creature of law"); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) ('In
the world of nature. .. there are things but clearly no property rights.").
249. As the cases discussed in supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text (as well as
innumerable others) demonstrate, a lack of formal legal entitlement does not mean that people
do not reasonably develop expectations whose frustration is perceived as a loss. Very often, the
law gives considerable weight to these expectations.
250. See also Stake, supra note 95, at 351 (arguing that loss aversion counsels for
maintaining the status quo).
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bias may thwart attempts to undo the legal reform once it is
implemented.
Finally, once it is understood that legal norms can sometimes
affect people's choices and behavior by setting the reference point, the
question arises as to whether and under what circumstances such
"manipulation" would be legitimate and desirable. In recent years,
this question has been extensively debated under the heading of "soft"
or "libertarian" paternalism: Should legal norms be used as a "nudge"
to improve people's decisions regarding their own welfare?2 51 A famous
example is encouraging people to save for old age by changing the
default to participation in savings plans and by adopting plans in
which the savings rate increases as one's income does. 252 But the issue
of reframing by the law goes far beyond paternalism. Framing of
decisions by the law may be used to attain goals other than enhancing
people's own welfare. It may be used to maximize overall social utility,
as in the case of increasing cadaveric organ donations by presumed
consent legislation;253 or to redistribute power or wealth, as in the case
of pro-consumer or pro-employee contractual default rules. 254
Each and every legal measure of this kind requires an in-depth
analysis of various normative and policy considerations. Elsewhere I
discussed and endorsed the use of default rules as a means for ad-hoc
paternalism and for the advancement of redistributive goals. 255 In
general, regulation by reframing decisions has the important
advantage of entailing lesser curtailment of people's freedom,
compared to most alternatives.
In summary, the potential effect of legal norms on people's
perceived baselines is a factor worth considering. Sometimes it
251. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (rev. ed. 2009) (advocating this type of soft
paternalism); Colin F. Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and
the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003) (same); Edward L.
Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006) (opposing even soft
paternalism); Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral
and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L REV. 1620 (2006) (same).
252. See Madrian & Shea, supra note 35 (describing the dramatic effect of changing the
default regarding retirement savings); Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More
TomorrowTM: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164
(2004) (describing the principles and robust effect of a plan in which the savings rate increases
with every salary raise).
253. Abadie & Gay, supra note 244; see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 240, at 220-22
(arguing that, in certain contexts, it might be desirable to protect intellectual property by
liability rules rather than by property rules, thereby reducing the endowment effect created by
the latter and (impliedly) facilitating better utilization of intellectual property).
254. See Zamir, supra note 36, at 1760-62, 1782-84 (describing the endowment effect
produced by contract default rules and their redistributive effect).
255. Id. at 1760-62, 1782-88.
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militates against changing the legal status quo because the losses
created by such a change loom larger than the gains. However, it can
sometimes produce great improvement with very minor interference
in people's freedom. In many (and probably most) cases, any attempt
to change people's perceptions through the law is likely to be futile.
Even when lawmakers do not strive to alter the prevailing framing of
decisions, they ought to be aware that legal norms can reinforce this
framing-which may or may not be desirable.
D. Lawmakers' Loss Aversion
Thus far, I focused on the normative aspects of the correlation
between the law and the loss aversion of people to whom the law
applies. Loss aversion and the presupposed reference dependence
presumably also characterize legal policymakers, such as legislators
and judges. Some studies have indeed examined the effects of framing,
loss aversion, and the related phenomena of status quo bias and the
endowment effect on legal decisionmaking. 256
Before commenting on the normative implications of these
effects, we need to address yet another aspect of the relationship
between psychology and normative (moral or legal) judgments. Cass
Sunstein has tentatively raised the possibility that the prevailing
deontological moral convictions-of the kind offered in Part III.B as
the connecting link between loss aversion and basic features of the
law-are nothing but "a series of cognitive errors."257 I do not share
this view. As several commentators have rightly pointed out, this
conjecture fails to distinguish between two different questions. One
question is which moral principles are sound (e.g., deontological or
consequentialist). Another question is what the appropriate process of
answering the first question is (intuitionist or deliberative). From the
fact that the prevailing moral intuitions are mostly deontological, it
follows neither that deliberative moral reasoning produces more sound
256. See, e.g, Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary
Insights into the "Affirmance Effect" on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 357, 377-81 (2005) (explaining courts of appeals' tendency to affirm lower courts' judgments
on the basis of the status quo and omission biases); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 794-99 (2001) (finding
that federal magistrate judges are susceptible to framing effects in assessing settlement
proposals); Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision
Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 638-41 (2003) (associating stare decisis and legal conservatism
with the status quo and omission biases).
257. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531, 532-34 (2005).
Conceding that one can make the parallel claim that "utilitarianism is itself a heuristic, one that
usually works well but leads to systematic errors," Sunstein does not argue that deontological
morality does in fact rest on cognitive errors. Id at 534.
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moral judgments nor that consequentialism is superior to deontology.
Indeed, absolutist deontology leads to unacceptable normative
judgments, such as the claim that one must not lie even to save the
life of an innocent person. But so does unqualified, act-
consequentialism when it justifies the killing of an innocent person
and harvesting her organs to save two lives. Rigid, overgeneralized
reliance on moral heuristics sometimes misfires, but so do inflexible
moral principles. In fact, the most fruitful way to arrive at sound
moral principles may be through a process of reflective equilibrium
where both intuitions ("heuristics') and principles play a role. 258
Having rejected the notion that loss aversion is irrational per
se 259 and having defended the soundness of moderate deontology
elsewhere, 260 I do agree that questionable or objectionable framing of
reference points may adversely affect legal policymaking. Cognizant of
the powerful effect of reference dependence, policymakers ought to
take heed of manipulative, or even innocuous, framing of decisions.
They should be suspicious of strategic framing of (factual, policy, or
normative) issues by lobbyists in the legislative process and by
advocates in adjudication (as well as by colleagues in collective
decisionmaking bodies). Moreover, conscious framing and refraining of
an issue in different ways is often an eye-opening exercise. It may help
challenge old truths and provide an antidote to excessive
conservatism. Such reframing has been proposed and debated in such
contexts as affirmative action,261 taxation,262 negative and positive
258. See Elizabeth Anderson, Moral Heuristics: Rigid Rules or flexible Inputs in Moral
Deliberation?, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 544 (2005) (rejecting Sunstein's representation of moral
heuristics as rigid and explaining their role as flexible inputs in moral deliberation); Karen
Bartsch & Jennifer Cole Wright, Towards and Intuitionist Account of Moral Development, 28
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 546 (2005) (pointing out that Sunstein fails to distinguish between the
process by which moral heuristics are employed and their structure; that his critique of the latter
applies equally to purely consequentialist principles; and that moral intuitions actually guard
against the pitfalls of both); Barbara H. Fried, Moral Heuristics and the Means/Ends
Distinction, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 549 (2005) (noting Sunstein's problematic treatment of the
relationship between moral heuristics and moral principles); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On Moral
Intuitions and Moral Heuristics: A Response, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 565, 566 (2005) ("I do not
suggest that moral heuristics are more likely to produce error than more systematic moral
thinking of any particular sort.').
259. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
260. ZAMIR & MEDINA, supra note 106, at 41-56.
261. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 5-11 (2002)
(proposing that some conventions in taxation are sufficiently pervasive to seem like natural law,
but actually those baselines should be evaluated and debated); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert
J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis be Divorced from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of
the "New Paradigm" and Its Denouncement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135 (2010) (discussing the crucial
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constitutional rights, 263 governmental takings,264 invalidation of
unconscionable contract terms, 265 and job security. 266
CONCLUSION
This Article sought to explain fundamental features of the law
through the psychological notions of reference points and loss
aversion. It argued that basic characteristics of the law-such as the
asymmetries between tort and unjust enrichment, between
governmental takings and givings, between hiring and firing in
affirmative action, between disgorgement and other goals of contract
remedies, and between tax credits and direct governmental outlays-
are best, or at least better, explained through these prevailing
psychological phenomena. It then proposed two theories for the
observed compatibility between human psychology and law: an
evolutionary theory focusing on plaintiffs' behavior and a two-step
theory based on the linkages between psychology and commonsense
morality and between commonsense morality and the law, focusing on
lawmakers' mindsets. Finally, the Article examined three types of
normative implications of the above analysis: justifying the described
features of the law, considering the implications of the role of law in
framing people's perceptions, and considering policymakers' own loss
aversion.
Given the ongoing, rapid accumulation of knowledge in the
disciplines of cognitive psychology, economics, behavioral economics,
moral psychology, evolution, and empirical legal studies, the
arguments put forth in this Article must be taken with some caution.
Additional experimental and empirical studies may shed more light on
the pertinent issues. In addition to its explanatory and normative
contributions, this Article may thus be read as an introduction to the
intriguing relationships between loss aversion and the law and an
invitation to further studies of these relationships.
role of a normative baseline tax system for tax expenditure analysis and different possibilities of
such a baseline); supra notes 163, 245-47 and accompanying text.
263. Bandes, supra note 155, at 2290-93.
264. See supra notes 94, 248 and accompanying text.
265. Morris R Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 585-92 (1933) (proposing
to view legal enforcement of contracts, rather than the refusal to enforce certain contracts or
contract terms, as an exercise of the sovereign power of the state).
266. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal
Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911 (1989) (questioning the implicit
baselines of the legal doctrine, the judicial reasoning, and the economic analysis of job security).
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Legal regulation of the family focuses on two canonical
relationships: marriage and parenthood. Courts, legislatures,
and scholars routinely take family law's concentration on just
two family ties to be so commonsensical as to require no
explicit discussion or explanation. Yet marriage and
parenthood are not the only family relationships that can be
central to family life. Family law's reflexive orientation around
marriage and parenthood diverts attention and scrutiny from
considering how the law should regulate and protect other
family ties. For instance, the sibling relationship is a crucial,
yet noncanonical family tie. Family law views children almost
exclusively through the lens of children's relationships with
their parents, rather than the lens of children's relationships
with their siblings. The law offers siblings only modest and
sporadic protection, too often permitting adoption and parental
divorce or death to separate siblings and sometimes leave them
with no right to contact each other or even learn of each other's
existence. But siblings can be vital sources of support, love,
nurturing, and stability for children, and family law could
and should do much more to safeguard sibling ties when they
are threatened. This Essay uses the example of sibling
relationships, which have received remarkably little legal
attention, to explore the law's treatment of noncanonical family
relationships and to consider some of the reform possibilities
that emerge when we free ourselves from the assumption that
family law should focus narrowly on marriage and
parenthood.

